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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prison model of punishment is overdue for 
deconstruction1 or at least a major overhaul.2  Indeed, the process 
 
       †     Director of Legal Information Services, New York State Defenders 
Association. J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John's 
University, 1994; B.A., summa cum laude, St. John's University, 1981.  I would like to 
thank Leah Graf for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
 1. See, e.g., Yves Bourque, Prison Abolition, 1 J. PRISONERS ON PRISONS 1 (1988) 
(describing experiences in the Canadian prison system).  “Prisons, no matter how 
‘beautiful’ we make them, no matter how ‘humane’ we would have them, no 
matter how ‘rehabilitative’ we devise them, will always be horror houses where 
public vengeance is administered, cruelly and destructively, on persons who are 
the most vulnerable and defenseless of our society.”  Id.; Louis X. Holloway, Prison 
Abolition or Destruction Is a Must!, 45 MISS. L.J. 757, 758 (1974) (“Even if all forms of 
racism and inhumanity could be eliminated from the prison systems, the problems 
1
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of sentencing offenders is out of line with the Constitution because 
it fails to recognize the role of prison conditions as an element of 
punishment.  Every sentence to a term of years pronounced by a 
judge is incomplete.  The length of time to be served is imposed 
without any mention or consideration of the conditions of 
confinement.  By virtue of their roles, the prosecutor, judge, and 
defense counsel are not concerned with the most important facet 
of a prison sentence, the “cruel” nature of incarcerative 
punishment.  Prosecutors formulate sentence recommendations in 
the blind, defendants make ill-informed decisions about whether to 
accept plea bargains, judges impose punishments without 
understanding their full import, and jurors are completely cut out 
of the loop.  It is a game of poker, where no player can see their 
cards and the accused must bet everything without knowing all the 
risks. 
Presently, those conditions are typically exposed and defined 
in Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners.  And when 
these problems are left unattended they can reach crisis 
proportions.  Mandatory disclosure of prison conditions would give 
prosecutors more discretion in the charging decision and 
sentencing recommendation; defense lawyers the opportunity to 
present mitigating evidence related to alternatives to incarceration, 
sentence reduction, or institutional classification; and judges the 
information needed to customize punishment for the individual in 
the interests of justice.3  Moreover, a policy that acknowledges 
 
would only be half solved.”). 
 2. See Rebecca McLennan, When Felons Were Human, ON HUM. (Aug. 16, 
2011), http://onthehuman.org/2011/08/when-felons-were-human/ (“Americans 
haven’t always perceived prisoners and convicts as exceptional categories of 
human or even an exceptional category of citizen, undeserving of most or all 
rights. Both the Progressive Era’s prison reform movement and the prisoner rights 
movements of the 1950s and ‘60s attracted considerable popular support—so 
much so, that many states actually embarked on ‘decarceration’ programs in the 
1960s and early 1970s (leading at least one prominent sociologist to predict in 
1977 that prisons might soon be a thing of the past).”).  See generally Carol Steiker, 
Introduction, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011) (describing current scholarly thinking 
about the problem of mass incarceration and possible solutions in a series of 
articles published in Symposium, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit 
Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu 
/osjcl/issues.php?ID=35). 
 3. See Alice G. Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
727, 748 (2009) (“When the drafters of the new [Model Penal] Code call for 
‘evidence-based penology’ and for more rigorous empirical research, perhaps they 
hope that the facts will speak for themselves. Perhaps the hope is that once people 
see how much sentences cost, and how little they apparently deter, the only 
2
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prison conditions in sentencing practices might serve to stem the 
tide of prison inflation.4  Acknowledgment of prison conditions was 
the motivation behind a newly enacted legislative scheme in 
California designed to reduce its state prison population and 
thereby address the unconstitutional conditions within. 
Part I of this article begins with a review of the state of 
incarceration as viewed through the lens of prison populations.  
Then in Part II, the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Brown 
v. Plata is explored, along with an analysis of its justifications for 
upholding a mass release order to remedy the inadequate medical 
and mental health facilities in an overcrowded state prison system.  
Part III describes California’s novel choice of realignment 
legislation to comply with this order as a legislative approach that 
does not result in mass release but rather a mass redirection of 
incoming offenders away from state prisons and into the local 
corrections system.  The potential for criminal sentencing reform 
inspired by the Court’s decision and the state’s realignment policy 
are further explored in Part IV, which examines past and present 
efforts to fine-tune incarcerative sentencing outcomes mindful of 
the conditions of confinement.  Finally, additional suggestions for 
uncovering and taking into account the conditions of confinement 
as an aid to reform are considered at different points along the 
adjudication spectrum. 
II. BY THE NUMBERS 
With more than 2 million men, women, and juveniles behind 
bars, the prison community is tantamount to a small country or a 
large city.5  The enormity of the problems created by prison life has 
 
rational response will be to reduce the length of prison sentences and look for 
other alternatives.”). 
 4. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING 
AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION, 2007–2011 25–26 (2007)[hereinafter PUBLIC 
SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING] , available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org 
/uploadedFiles/Public%20Safety%20Public%20Spending.pdf (“The profiles 
highlight states that have broadened their approaches to criminal justice, making 
prisons one item on a larger menu of options for dealing with the wide spectrum 
of criminal behavior.”). 
 5. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2010, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 tbl.2 (2011), available 
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (providing the adult correctional 
system populations in 2010: Probation, 4,055,514; Parole, 840,676; Prison, 
1,518,104; Local Jail 748,728; Multiple statuses (e.g., jail and probation) 86,823; 
Total 7,076,200); see also PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING, supra note 4, at ii 
3
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drawn the attention of government and civic leaders who joined to 
form the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons.6  
This nonpartisan entity investigated the “dangerous conditions of 
confinement—violence, poor medical and mental health care, and 
inappropriate segregation—that can also endanger the public; the 
challenges facing labor and management; weak oversight of 
correctional facilities; and serious flaws in available data about 
violence and abuse in prisons and jails .”7  Overcrowding, solitary 
confinement, sexual abuse, mistreatment, inadequate medical care, 
assault, and a myriad of other deprivations are scarcely being 
addressed by legislative enactments and responsible oversight.8  
Until this changes, the burden will continue to fall to the courts to 
resolve these issues through prison litigation. 
The Eighth Amendment guarantees that no one shall be 
subject to cruel and unusual punishment.9  Cruel and unusual 
punishment cannot be defined based on a locale or the perceived 
culpability of the accused: neither should the conditions of 
confinement be selectively defined based on parochial notions of 
retribution, economics, or politics.10  Justice should be justice 
everywhere, and not reliant on the luck of the draw.11  Thus the 
 
(“[S]tate and federal prisons will swell by more than 192,000 inmates over the next 
five years.”). 
 6. See Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, Mission, VERA INST. 
JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/commission-safety-and-abuse-americas-prisons 
/#/project/commission-safety-and-abuse-americas-prisons/mission (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2012) (including access to hearing transcripts, expert testimony, and the 
Confronting Confinement 2006 final report). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Office of Justice Programs, Prison Rape Elimination Act Publications 
and Resources, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs 
/prisonrapeelimination.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (containing text of act, 
reports on its implementation, statistical studies, and related resources). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  See 
generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3D 111 (1973). 
 10. Cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The Court’s precedents on the rights of prisoners rest on the 
implicit (and erroneous) presumption that the Constitution contains an implicit 
definition of incarceration. This is manifestly not the case, and, in my view, States 
are free to define and redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, 
to encompass various types of deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Under this view, the Court’s precedents on 
prisoner ‘rights’ bear some reexamination.”). 
 11. See, e.g., John Wisely, Drunken-Driving Penalties Could Depend on Your 
Location, USA TODAY (July 28, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news 
4
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laws that decide which offenders go to state prison or local jail, or 
are eligible for alternatives to incarceration or early release, should 
be informed by data about the effects that current crime policies 
are having on the prison population and the conditions within.  
Full disclosure of jail and prison conditions can become part of a 
scheme to inform judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
defendants who must make choices about the course of criminal 
litigation.  The numerically based incarcerative sentence is 
inextricably linked to the ensuing punishment and hazards of 
prison life. 
Our Constitution is a fountainhead of fairness that has 
inspired the legal progress of nations across the world since its 
creation.12  And yet, no country following this blueprint has 
experienced the colossal rise in incarceration that has occurred in 
America.  Out of a total population of about 309 million people,13 
the United States imprisons nearly 2.3 million—representing more 
than one-fifth of the world’s prison population.14  It’s a creeping 
decimal point that bears no relation to changes in crime rates, 
improvements in controlling human behavior, increases in quality 
of life, or greater safety for citizens.  This is in addition to the other 
precincts of confinement including noncitizen detention,15 mental 
health post release commitments pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act 
and similar state statutes,16 and pretrial detention.17  Unlike the 
 
/nation/2011-07-28-drunken-driving-first-offense-sentencing_n.htm (“Different 
courts use different means, from fines, probation, education classes and jail time, 
and the court a driver ends up in often is a big factor in the type of punishment 
handed down.”).  See generally Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality 
in the States, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971569. 
 12. See generally Albert P. Blaustein, Our Most Important Export: The Influence of 
the United States Constitution Abroad, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 15 (1987). 
 13. See USA Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov 
/qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Jan. 17, 2012). 
 14. See GLAZE, supra note 5, at 3 tbl.1 (stating that the 2010 jail and prison 
population estimate was 2,266,800); ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, 
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
 15. According to the federal government, 87,235 noncitizens were held in 
federal and state facilities in 2008.  See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—
STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.20 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (stating the reported number of non-U.S. citizens held in 
state or federal prisons, by gender, region, and jurisdiction from June 30, 2007 to 
June 30, 2008). 
 16. See Nina Totenberg, Federal Prisoners Kept Beyond Their Sentences, NPR (Jan. 
5
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national debt ceiling, there is no limit to the maximum number of 
persons who might be incarcerated. 
The reasons for the phenomenal growth of the number of 
incarcerated persons, not to mention parolees and probationers, 
are changes in public policy and crime control.18  When Senator 
Jim Webb presided over the Joint Economic Committee hearing on 
mass incarceration, he observed: “The growth in the prison 
population is only nominally related to crime rates. . . . [I]n the 
Washington Post, the deputy director of the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics stated that ‘the growth [in the incarceration rate] wasn’t 
really about increas[ed] crime but how we chose to respond to crime.’”19  
This is the fundamental point: prison overpopulation is society’s 
current response to maintaining law and order. 
Crime statistics have long been touted as the principle 
justification behind longer sentences and prison bond issues.20  
Still, prison building and hence imprisonment of offenders bears 
little or no relation to crime rates. 21  Of all the factors that 
 
12, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122452485. 
 17. See MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.1.1 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf (stating the 
figures for suspects arrested for federal offenses and booked by U.S. Marshals 
Service, by offense, from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008). 
 18. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 33–34 (4th ed. 2003) 
(discussing the shift away from the rehabilitative model to a “just deserts” theory of 
punishment). 
 19. See Mass Incarceration in the United States: At What Cost?: Hearing Before the 
Joint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb, Member, 
Joint Econ. Comm.) http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id 
=d4b29f7b-bb6b-4f88-be56-f7d1649b5c82 (emphasis added).  Senator Webb also 
noted: 
The steep increase in the number of people in prison is driven, 
according to most experts, by changes in drug policy and tougher 
sentencing, and not necessarily an increase in crime.  Also, the 
composition of prison admissions has shifted toward less serious offenses: 
parole violations and drug offenses.  Nearly 6 in 10 persons in state 
prison for a drug offense have no history of violence or significant selling 
activity.  In 2005, four out of five drug arrests were for possession and 
only one out of five were for sales. 
Id. 
 20. See Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes 
Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
75, 76 (1999) (noting that money is allocated to states from the federal 
government based on the average number of violent crimes committed in the 
preceding three years). 
 21. Crime rates have continued to fall and have failed to significantly 
correlate with prison population and reentry numbers, confounding predictions 
6
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determine whether there is a rise in crime, the number of people 
in prison is not chief among them.22  In other words, locking up 
millions of people and throwing away the key has not reduced 
crime as promised. 
The proliferation of new penal offenses and stepped-up 
enforcement of existing penal statutes23 accompanied by 
mandatory minimum prison terms, escalating recidivist and truth-
 
and perplexing criminal justice policymakers.  See PEW CTR. ON STATES, ONE IN 31: 
THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 20 (2009), available at http://www. 
pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-
09.pdf (“[E]ven the statistical models most generous to prisons find that most of 
the crime drop was attributable to forces other than incarceration.  These include 
a strengthening economy, aging drug epidemics and changes in law enforcement, 
including the expansion of police forces and the adoption of new policing 
strategies.”); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24crime.html 
?_r=3&scp=1&sq=%22Steady%20Decline%20in%20Major%20Crime%20Baffles%
20Experts%22&st=cse (“Nationally, the drop in violent crime not only calls into 
question the theory that crime rates are closely correlated with economic 
hardship, but another argument as well, said Frank E. Zimring, a law professor at 
the University of California, Berkeley.  As the percentage of people behind bars 
has decreased in the past few years, violent crime rates have fallen as well.  For 
those who believed that higher incarceration rates inevitably led to less crime, ‘this 
would also be the last time to expect a crime decline,’ he said.”).  See generally 
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–
2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf (“In the last decade (since 2000) 
the homicide rate declined to levels last seen in the mid-1960s.”); Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 19 2011), 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s. 
2010/2010%20CIUS%20Summary.pdf (“The 2010 statistics show that the 
estimated volumes of violent and property crimes declined 6.0 percent and 2.7 
percent, respectively, when compared with the 2009 estimates.”).  For access to the 
full report, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2010, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2010 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).  For current and earlier reports, visit 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).  
 22. See Marc Mauer & David Cole, Five Myths About Americans in Prison, WASH. 
POST (June 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-
about-incarceration/2011/06/13/AGfIWvYH_story.html (“Harvard University 
sociologist Bruce Western believes that increased incarceration accounts for only 
about 10 percent of the drop in crime rates; William Spelman, a professor of 
public affairs at the University of Texas, puts the figure at about 25 percent.  Even 
if the higher figure is accurate, three-quarters of the crime decline had nothing to 
do with imprisonment.  Other causes include changes in drug markets, policing 
strategies and community initiatives to reshape behavior.”). 
 23. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold 
of Guilt Declines, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424053111904060604576570801651620000.html. 
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in-sentencing laws, and buttressed by reflexive parole board 
denials,24 are the principle mechanisms for incarcerating people 
and keeping them in prison.25  The result is “one in 100 adults 
looking out at this country from behind an expensive wall of 
bars.”26  Removing people from society has not eliminated the 
causes of crime, and has solved far fewer problems than the cost of 
this approach has warranted. 
The consequences of carceral inflation have not produced any 
true countervailing benefits.27  Any law that can incarcerate people 
and send them to prison for a mandatory number of years will cast 
an excessively wide net capable of emptying entire city blocks.28  In 
 
 24. This should be qualified by the changing policies for release, “where 
parole still exists.”  See, e.g., Joe Lambe & Tony Rizzo, Concerns Arise Over Plan to 
Dissolve Kansas Parole Board, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 3, 2011, at § B, 1 (“About 15 states 
have eliminated parole boards.”). 
 25. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 6 (2010), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org 
/uploadedFiles/Collateral_Costs.pdf?n=8653. 
Rather, the growth flowed primarily from changes in sentencing laws, 
inmate release decisions, community supervision practices and other 
correctional policies that determine who goes to prison and for how 
long.  And while expanded incarceration contributed to the drop in 
violent crime in the United States during the 1990s, research shows that 
having more prisoners accounted for only about 25 percent of the 
reduction, leaving the other 75 percent to be explained by better 
policing and a variety of other, less expensive factors. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 26. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 21 
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One 
%20in%20100.pdf. 
The United States incarcerates more people than any country in the 
world, including the far more populous nation of China.  At the start of 
the new year, the American penal system held more than 2.3 million 
adults.  China was second, with 1.5 million people behind bars, and 
Russia was a distant third with 890,000 inmates, according to the latest 
available figures.  Beyond the sheer number of inmates, America also is 
the global leader in the rate at which it incarcerates its citizenry, 
outpacing nations like South Africa and Iran.  In Germany, 93 people are 
in prison for every 100,000 adults and children.  In the U.S, the rate is 
roughly eight times that, or 750 per 100,000. 
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. See Effective Investments in Public Safety: Mass Incarceration and Longer 
Sentences Fail to Make Us Safer, JUST. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2, 2007), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/07-02_fac_ 
massincarceration_ac-ps.pdf. 
 28. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Million-Dollar Blocks: The Neighborhood Costs of 
America’s Prison Boom, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 9, 2004), http://www.villagevoice.com 
/2004-11-09/news/million-dollar-blocks/1/. 
In Brooklyn last year, there were 35 blocks that fit this category [(Million-
8
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addition, prison walls cast a long shadow that follow inmates back 
into society, where they are hard put to find housing, jobs, or 
reunite with their families after years of desocialization.29 
In a recent article,30 Professor Bruce Western made three key 
observations about the corrosive effect of mass incarceration on 
society: (1) persons with prison records do not fare as well 
economically as those who have never served time;31 (2) the 
families of the incarcerated suffer as well, resulting in harm to the 
core family units without a father or mother to stabilize them;32 and 
(3) the prison preference in punishment negatively impacts the 
perception of justice in the neighborhoods most directly affected 
by this shift in population from homes to prison cells.33  Overall, 
Professor Western believes that the negative effects of mass 
imprisonment have reached the tipping point.34  Sentencing 
increasingly large numbers of people to jail has an inverse effect on 
the ability to reduce or control crime.  At the same time, those who 
return to society find fewer opportunities because of their prison 
records, and therefore become more susceptible to recidivism.  
Home life for many is disrupted when a parent is sent to prison, 
putting their children at risk of problems in school or delinquent 
 
Dollar Blocks)]—ones where so many residents were sent to state prison 
that the total cost of their incarceration will be more than $1 million. 
. . . . 
A map of million-dollar blocks, with stark concentrations of color, can 
quickly convey a sense of how self-defeating many criminal-justice policies 
have become—how, for example, spending exorbitant amounts of money 
locking people up means there’s far less money available for programs 
that decrease crime, like education, drug treatment, mental-health care, 
and job training. 
Id. at 1, 2. 
 29. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral 
Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1213 (2010) (discussing the 
obstacles in employment, housing and civil life facing the massive numbers of 
prisoners released back into society); Edgardo Rotman, Criminal Law: Do Criminal 
Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1023, 1023 (1986) (describing the need to recognize that a rehabilitative mindset 
ought to inform the process for prisoner reentry, which is at least impliedly found 
in constitutional principles applied to the treatment of prisoners). 
 30. See Bruce Western, Locked Up, Locked Out: The Social Costs of Incarceration, 
REASON (July 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/06/locked-up-locked-
out. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
9
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behavior.35 
There are a host of other issues created by government 
management of such a large segment of the population that are 
unrelated to incarceration as punishment.  Among the collateral 
but motivating issues fueling policy debates on the efficacy and 
necessity of prisons are economics, (i.e., the importance of 
correctional facilities to local and state economies);36 census 
counts37 and voting rights;38 prison labor and the issues 
surrounding its use, wages, and working conditions;39 and the 
awarding of contracts to private companies to run correctional 
facilities.40  These non-penological issues have nothing to do with 
crime rates, rehabilitation, or the welfare of the incarcerated.41  
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org 
/scans/huling_chapter.pdf (“Communities suffering from declines in farming, 
mining, timber-work and manufacturing are now begging for prisons to be built in 
their backyards.”). 
 37. See, e.g., New York, PRISON POL’Y INITATIVE, 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/newyork.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) 
(“New York State enacted legislation ensuring that incarcerated persons will be 
counted as residents of their home communities when state and local legislative 
districts are redrawn in New York next year.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Voting Behind Bars: An Argument for Voting by Prisoners, 
54 HOW. L.J. 549, 550 (2011) (“[F]elony disenfranchisement policies are 
inherently undemocratic no matter how applied.”). 
 39. See generally Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What 
Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 395 (2009) (discussing how the Eighth Amendment and the Thirteenth 
Amendment should apply to prison labor); Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries 
of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 857 (2008) (taking a look at employment’s economic character as 
seen through the window of legal disputes over prison labor). 
 40. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL 
STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION 
POLICIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy 
/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf (“Approximately 129,000 people were held 
in privately managed correctional facilities in the United States as of December 31, 
2009; 16.4 percent of federal and 6.8 percent of state populations were held in 
private facilities.” (footnote omitted)).  See generally Ruth Levush, Israel: 
Unconstitutionality of Privatization of Prisons, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Nov. 27, 2009), 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401697_text (“The 
[Supreme] Court [of Israel, sitting as a High Court of Justice,] determined that 
the transfer of management and operation of a prison from the state to a private 
corporation by awarding it a franchise would cause harm to the constitutional 
rights of freedom of liberty and human dignity of the prisoners.”). 
 41. In these precarious economic times, prison is seen by some as a substitute 
for social services.  For example, a man voluntarily sought incarceration by 
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They are all the indisputable concomitants of a form of 
punishment that is also an industry where “time is money.” 
A depiction of the prison-industrial complex phenomena 
made in 1998 is telling, as the policies that led to this state of affairs 
have not changed: 
[The prison-industrial complex] is composed of 
politicians, both liberal and conservative, who have used 
the fear of crime to gain votes; impoverished rural areas 
where prisons have become a cornerstone of economic 
development; private companies that regard the roughly 
$35 billion spent each year on corrections not as a burden 
on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and 
government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along 
with the inmate population.42 
The fallout from these policies and practices will be examined 
in light of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Brown v. 
Plata43 and California’s innovative legislative response. 
 
robbing a bank in order to gain access to health care.  See Diane Turbyfill, Bank 
Robber Planned Crime and Punishment, GASTON GAZETTE (June 16, 2011, 5:18 PM), 
http://www.gastongazette.com/news/bank-58397-richard-hailed.html (describing 
James Richard Verone, a 59-year-old unemployed man suffering from 
excruciatingly painful, undiagnosed medical problems and lacking any financial 
resources, who turned to bank robbery as a means for getting health care).  While 
incarceration might seem like a viable, albeit desperate solution, there is no 
guarantee that access to health care will be provided.  See, e.g., Ohio Inmate Kills Self; 
Lawyers Claim Mistreatment, HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W. Va.) (June 2, 2011, 
9:00 PM), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/x295394202/Ohio-inmate-kills-
self-lawyers-claim-mistreatment (“Gregory Stamper, convicted of a double 
homicide in 1995, hanged himself on Wednesday at Allen Correctional Institution 
in Lima in northwestern Ohio.  Stamper, 61, suffered from damage to his nervous 
system but was taken off a medication that had helped ease the pain, the Ohio 
Justice and Policy Center said Thursday.”). 
 42. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 
1998, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-
prison-industrial-complex/4669/ (“Since 1991 the rate of violent crime in the 
United States has fallen by about 20 percent, while the number of people in prison 
or jail has risen by 50 percent.  The prison boom has its own inexorable logic.  
Steven R. Donziger, a young attorney who headed the National Criminal Justice 
Commission in 1996, explains the thinking: ‘If crime is going up, then we need to 
build more prisons; and if crime is going down, it’s because we built more 
prisons—and building even more prisons will therefore drive crime down even 
lower.’”); see also Public Safety Performance Project: State Corrections Spending, PEW 
CENTER ON STATES (2005), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles 
/Statistics%20and%20Facts.pdf (“Federal, state and local governments spend 
approximately $62 billion per year on adult and juvenile corrections.”). 
 43. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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III. BROWN V. PLATA: PRISON CONDITIONS REVEALED  
The constitutionality of prison conditions was the central issue 
in a pair of cases44 that exposed the fault lines in the California 
criminal justice system and ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The Court’s five-four decision in Brown v. Plata,45 upholding the 
three-judge federal panel’s order to reduce the state’s prison 
population to 137.5% of design capacity, revealed the shortcomings 
of mass incarceration for the entire justice system. 
In 2011, the State of California became the poster child for the 
most pernicious outcome of mass incarceration—overcrowding.46  
The deplorable state of its prisons due to the lack of adequate 
medical and mental health care had been the subject of studies and 
inquiries over the years,47 but did not garner serious attention until 
 
 44. Two prisoner class actions were filed against California officials claiming 
indifference to medical and psychological health needs in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8878 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (discussing medical neglect in the prison system); 
Coleman v. Wilson, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786 
(E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994) (discussing inmates with serious mental health care 
needs).  These cases were eventually consolidated before a special three-judge 
court convened by the Ninth Circuit, which ordered the population reduction.  
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, No. C01-1351 TEH, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2711, at *30 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (noting its 
August 4, 2009 finding that overcrowding was the primary cause of the failure of 
the State to provide constitutionally sufficient medical and mental health care and 
that a prison release order was the only effective remedy under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4)), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Plata, 131 
S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 45. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910. 
 46. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Ruling on Prison Overcrowding a Warning to States?, 
MCCLATCHY (May 24, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/24/114702 
/ruling-on-prison-overcrowding.html (“All 50 states got a wakeup call this week 
when the Supreme Court ordered California to aggressively reduce its prison 
overcrowding.  The [C]ourt’s decision will make it easier for judges to shrink 
prison populations elsewhere.  It also could embolden other challenges to prison 
conditions well beyond California.”). 
 47. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: 
TIME IS RUNNING OUT (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185 
/Report185.pdf; CORRS. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, CALIFORNIA PERFORMANCE REVIEW, 
REFORMING CORRECTIONS 121–61 (2004), available at http://cpr.ca.gov/Review 
_Panel/pdf/from7to11.pdf (discussing inmate and parolee population 
management); LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO 
LOWER PRISON COSTS AND REDUCE CRIME (1998), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov 
/studies/144/report144.pdf; see also Proclamation, Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Governor of Cal., Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 4, 
2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 (listing the overcrowding 
numbers at California state prisons and correctional institutions and proclaiming a 
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two longstanding lawsuits finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court.48  
The first class action, Coleman v. Brown, had been filed in 1990 on 
behalf of prisoners with “serious mental disorders” who were not 
receiving adequate care or supervision and endured unbearable 
conditions resulting in a substantial suicide rate.49  The other 
action launched in 2001, Plata v. Brown, represented the 
complaints of inmates with “serious medical conditions” that were 
not getting necessary treatment.50 
After dealing with court orders for five years in Plata and 
twelve years in Coleman, it was clear that the proposed remedies had 
failed.51  The tribulations cataloged by the courts below persisted 
and finally led to the convening of a special three-judge court to 
resolve them.52  Among the problems created by overcrowding, the 
three-judge court took note of the overtaxed staff and medical 
facilities and the dangerous and unsanitary environment due to the 
lack of treatment, all of which hindered the implementation of a 
constitutional remedy.53  But the appropriateness of the remedy in 
response to the harm uncovered had to be measured by the acid 
test of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).54  Thus, 
the issue boiled down to whether the three-judge court had 
correctly followed procedures under the PLRA  and given the state 
sufficient time to pursue other options when it concluded that a 
prisoner release order was the only answer to the conditions 
uncovered in California’s prisons.55 
 
State of Emergency). 
 48. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910. 
 49. Id. at 1922, 1926. 
 50. Id. at 1926–27. 
 51. Id. at 1923, 1931. 
 52. Id. at 1922.  The conditions precedent to the three-judge court were met 
by the Coleman court’s appointment of a Special Master, the Plata consent decree 
and receivership, and the State’s failure to address the constitutional claims in 
both cases.  Id. at 1930–32. 
 53. Id. at 1932. 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). 
 55. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922–23. 
Under the PLRA, only a three-judge court may enter an order limiting a 
prison population.  Before a three-judge court may be convened, a 
district court first must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that 
failed to remedy the constitutional violation and must have given the 
defendant a reasonable time to comply with its prior orders. 
Id. at 1929 (internal citations omitted).  The viewpoints expressed in the majority 
and dissenting opinions are the first referendum by the Supreme Court on the 
efficacy and legality of systemic remedies to prison conditions envisioned by 
Congress under the PLRA. 
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A. The Majority 
Prison is the antipode of all the liberties guaranteed under the 
Constitution.  Those liberties are curtailed as part of the 
punishment narrative.  Nonetheless, each person behind bars is a 
node of needs, rights, and responsibilities, like any citizen in 
society.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Brown v. Plata, 
recognized that the essentials of food, shelter, and clothing had to 
be provided and regulated by prison administration.56  In other 
words, a person extracted from their place in the world and 
deposited within the confines of a penal institution radiates needs 
that are not fairly taken into account in assessing sentencing laws, 
the size of prison populations, and the resources devoted to that 
population’s care and supervision.  This is the overarching reason 
behind the deleterious conditions of confinement revealed in 
litigation over violations of the Eighth Amendment, and has 
resulted principally from prison overcrowding.  Yet, was it the 
essential cause or just one of many? 
The majority’s analysis of the problem in Plata began with the 
PLRA’s requirement that “crowding” had to have been the 
“primary cause” of the constitutional violation.57  Since this finding 
relied on a factual determination, the Court was sensitive to the 
need for deference to the trial court’s findings.58  Justice Kennedy 
recounted the long, sad history of mental and medical health care 
in the California prison system revealed by the record in the courts 
below.59 
Vacancies for key health care positions had been unfilled at 
the time of trial: “[Twenty percent] for surgeons, 25% for 
physicians, 39% for nurse practitioners, and 54.1% for 
psychiatrists.”60  And filling these positions did not address the lack 
 
 56. Id. at 1928 (“To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to 
provide for their own needs.  Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, 
clothing, and necessary medical care. . . . A prison that deprives prisoners of basic 
sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of 
human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E).  “The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner 
release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that—(i) 
crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and (ii) no other 
relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.”  Id. 
 58. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932.  Ironically, this deference is a critical fault raised 
by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, to be discussed later.  See infra notes 
110–25 and accompanying text. 
 59. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932–34. 
 60. Id. at 1932. 
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of space for performing necessary services.61  The combination of 
insufficient staffing and space resulted in “significant delays in 
treatment.”62  Inmates seeking mental health care were typically 
held in segregation until a bed was available, while others were 
confined in “tiny, phone-booth sized cages.”63  And the line for 
medical care was as long as 700 people at any given time.64  The 
other concomitants of overcrowding that aggravated the lack of 
treatment for mental and physical problems included “unsafe and 
unsanitary living conditions”65 and an uptick in violence among 
prisoners.66 
The State complained that the three-judge court did not 
permit introduction of evidence showing current conditions.67  
Justice Kennedy found that this assertion was betrayed by the lower 
court’s reliance on current data and information sources: recent 
facility tours by expert witnesses; expert evaluations; statistics on 
suicide rates, staff vacancies, shortages of treatment beds, as well as 
other data.68  Overall, information about past problems and current 
conditions formed a continuum of evidence that was suitable to 
make a finding under the PLRA.  Thus, the State’s claim lacked 
merit. 
While prison crowding was not the only cause of these 
conditions, it was the foremost.  And the lower courts 
acknowledged that population reduction alone would not be 
adequate unless accompanied by other reforms (i.e., staff training, 
improvement in facilities, and revamping existing procedures for 
health care management).69  Still, the Court emphasized that the 
congressional intent behind the PLRA was that overcrowding had 
 
 61. Id. at 1933. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  See id. at app. C for a picture and caption that reads: “Salinas Valley 
State Prison, July 29, 2008, Correctional Treatment Center (dry cages/holding 
cells for people waiting for mental health crisis bed).” 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  At any given time, 200 prisoners live in a gymnasium monitored by 
only two or three correctional officers and “[a]s many as 54 prisoners may share a 
single toilet.”  Id. at 1924 (referring to images in appendix B at page 1949 with 
captions from the original opinion: “Mule Creek State Prison, Aug. 1, 2008” and 
“California Institution for Men, Aug. 7, 2006,”). 
 66. Id. at 1934.  Inmate violence resulted in lockdowns that increased the 
workload for staff escorting prisoners to the medical facilities, or resulted in the 
cancellation of certain programs altogether during these periods.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 1935. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1936. 
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to be the “primary cause,” albeit not the only reason for 
unconstitutional prison conditions.70 
Justice Kennedy went on to observe that addressing these 
severe deficiencies in the conditions of confinement would be 
impeded by state budget deficits, absence of political motivation for 
reform, poorly designed facilities, and across the board 
administrative mismanagement.71  Thus, a complex problem 
necessitated a complex solution.  Again, relying on Congress’s 
intent in authorizing federal courts to handle these types of 
problems, the Court held that the PLRA was not written to fetter 
the federal district courts in ordering “practical remedies” in the 
face of system-wide failure.72  Population release orders were to be 
strictly construed, but were still available to be employed in the 
right circumstances.73  Releasing prisoners was an option of “last 
resort,” but still one that could be resorted to.74  The fact that other 
steps would also be necessary to fix the problem did not diminish 
the primacy of the release order.75  In other words, a finding that 
prison overcrowding was the primary cause of constitutional 
violations did not preclude a multifaceted solution. 
Another prong of the PLRA statute mandated that “no other 
relief” would resolve the issue.76  As already discussed, a principal 
cause did not mandate a single solution.  But the other remedies 
proffered by the state (i.e., prisoner transfer, new construction, and 
additional hires), did not measure up.77  The record demonstrated 
that transferring prisoners was inadequate to reduce their 
numbers; new prisons were unlikely to be built in light of 
California’s fiscal difficulties; plans to expand existing buildings 
failed to include sufficient administrative facilities; new hires were 
unlikely in view of the inability to fill those positions so far; and 
even if those positions were filled promptly, there was no place for 
them to work.78  California’s budgetary and legislative roadblocks 
and the state’s record of not making inroads on its proposed 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1937. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104–21, at 25(1995)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2006) (stating that “no other relief will 
remedy the violation of the Federal right.”). 
 77. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1937. 
 78. Id. at 1937–38. 
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solutions demonstrated to the Court that the past was prologue.  
The state’s lack of progress became a major factor in approving the 
three-judge court’s decision to order prisoner release.79 
While population reduction was the most efficacious method 
for alleviating the pressures created by unconstitutional conditions 
of confinement, it did not obscure the effect of the sudden reentry 
of thousands of inmates into California communities.80  The PLRA 
was clear about the need to make solutions “narrowly drawn” so 
that there was a fit between problem and solution obviating the 
risks of fallout on society at large.81  The statute demanded that the 
remedy be proportional to the problem. 
A solution contending with overcrowding was bound to have 
collateral effects.  Nonetheless, the remedy of prisoner release was 
not invalidated for that reason.82  Thus, the scope of the order had 
to reflect the unconstitutional conditions in the complaints.83  The 
Court found that limiting the remedy only to the plaintiffs in these 
class actions would have been too narrow and would not address 
the revolving numbers of persons who would inevitably require 
medical and mental health treatment.84  The plaintiffs were victims 
of systemic problems, and a remedy tailored only to them and 
failing to fix systemic conditions would only result in chronic 
litigation by newly minted victims.  In addition, a systemic remedy 
did not translate into an overbroad solution, since administration 
and resources for the prisons’ medical facilities are operated at the 
 
 79. Id. at 1939 (“A long history of failed remedial orders, together with 
substantial evidence of overcrowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care, 
compels a different conclusion today.”). 
 80. See generally Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVE, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2012). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). 
(a) Requirements for relief. (1) Prospective relief. (A) Prospective relief 
in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no 
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a 
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.  The court shall not grant or approve any 
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly 
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right.  The court shall give substantial weight to 
any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system 
caused by the relief. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939–40. 
 83. Id. at 1940. 
 84. Id. 
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state level.85 
Moreover, granulating the release order would have impinged 
on the state officials’ power to structure an appropriate population 
reduction plan.  Indeed, the three-judge court’s order gave 
California “substantial flexibility” in deciding who should be 
released,86 and to customize the release plan based on each 
prison.87  Still, some judicial supervision was required to assure that 
the order was carried out.88  Deference to the authority and power 
of state officials in administering the prison system was appropriate 
according to the Court, but the PLRA did not contemplate 
complete abdication of judicial oversight—the heart of the 
problem had been the failure of the state to implement its 
proposed solutions.89 
The release of tens of thousands of prisoners by judicial fiat 
demanded serious attention to public safety and the operations of 
the criminal justice system.  While the PLRA did not require that 
the prisoner release order have no adverse effects,90 a balance had 
to be struck.91  There was already a steady stream of thousands of 
inmates reentering California communities,92 but the population 
cap would result in a sudden influx of 46,000 prisoners (or fewer if 
the 9,000 prisoner population reduction that had already occurred 
was counted).93  Still, the issue was whether the harm created by 
unabated overcrowding outweighed the effects on the community 
of releasing inmates to ease the pressure within prisons.94  Relying 
on statistical evidence, and the testimony of state officials and 
expert witnesses, the three-judge court—employing a cost-benefit 
analysis—had found in favor of prisoner release.95 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1940–41. 
 88. Id. at 1941. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1941–42 
 91. Id. at 1942. 
 92. See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009 app. tbl.10 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (including California releases by year: 2000: 
129,621; 2008: 136,925; 2009: 128,869). 
 93. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923, 1946.  It was revealed at oral argument that in the 
two years since the three-judge court’s decision, California had reduced the prison 
population by 9,000 inmates.  Id. at 1946. 
 94. Id. at 1941. 
 95. Id. at 1942–43 (including expert evidence in the form of studies of the 
uneventful release of prisoners in other states to ease overcrowding). 
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The state had several options that would have had negligible 
effects on public safety—for example, granting more good time 
credits and early release to low-risk recidivists; diversion of low-risk 
offenders to community-based treatment programs or home 
monitoring; and handling technical parole violations through 
community-based programs.96  These channels for supervising and 
monitoring offenders in the community already existed—and 
debunked the argument that a decrease in the inmate populations 
would simply involve opening the prison doors.  And other reentry 
programs were in place to ease the transition of the huge number 
of inmates who were already returning to the community under 
normal circumstances.97  Also, during the pendency of the 
litigation, officials had begun to implement measure that would 
redirect state-sentenced prisoners to local jails—with no impact on 
public safety.98 
The population cap, 137.5% of design capacity, was arrived at 
by the three-judge court by extrapolation from official and expert 
testimony about the appropriate limits.99  The state contended that 
the court relied too heavily on experts who were offering policy 
positions rather than realistic estimates.100  But Justice Kennedy 
noted that expert evidence was essential in considering this type of 
issue and in fashioning a remedy for violations based on prison 
conditions.101  For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had set 
130% as its ultimate aim for population limits, which had been 
adopted by the experts.102  And the use of such standards proved 
instructive albeit nonbinding.  At the same time, California’s 
Corrections Independent Review Panel put forward 145% as a 
workable number.103  Still, this figure did not take into account the 
unconstitutional conditions created by inadequate mental and 
medical health care.104  In light of the problems to be resolved and 
the absence of more suitable figures from the state, an equitable 
compromise seemed appropriate, which is how the lower three-
 
 96. Id. at 1943. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1943–44. 
 99. Id. at 1944. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1944–45 (“[E]xpert opinion may be relevant when determining 
what is obtainable and what is acceptable in corrections philosophy.”). 
 102. Id. at 1945. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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judge court reached the 137.5% figure.105 
The two-year deadline ordered by the lower court was set to 
run from the date of the Supreme Court’s decision.106  As noted 
earlier, the state had already made some gains since the 2009 lower 
court ruling.107  Yet, the court issuing a remedy for a continuing 
violation retains responsibility for seeing that it is accomplished in 
a timely and effective manner.108  Also, since state prison officials 
retained the discretion in their choice of methods for attaining the 
goal of population reduction, the deadline could be modified upon 
the state’s motion based on their efforts at compliance.109 
Thus, the majority opinion upheld the lower court’s decision, 
rejecting arguments by the state that the remedy was too broad, 
insufficiently supported, and overstepped the judiciary’s proper 
role by intruding upon the management of the state prison system.  
However, four justices in two dissenting opinions took up these 
arguments in their criticism of what they collectively considered to 
be judicial overreaching. 
B. The Dissents 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, voiced strong 
disapproval of the majority’s ruling that would allow the release of 
thousands of convicted felons back onto the streets.110  This remedy 
was so disturbing and “absurd” that Justice Scalia believed the law 
ought to be interpreted in any manner necessary to avoid the 
result.111  He pointed out that a strict reading of the PLRA as well as 
 
 105. Id. (“The PLRA’s narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied so long as these 
equitable, remedial judgments are made with the objective of releasing the fewest 
possible prisoners consistent with an efficacious remedy.”). 
 106. Id. at 1946. 
 107. See id. (“At oral argument, the State indicated it had reduced its prison 
population by approximately 9,000 persons since the decision of the three-judge 
court.  After oral argument, the State filed a supplemental brief indicating that it 
had begun to implement measures to shift ‘thousands’ of additional prisoners to 
county facilities.”). 
 108. Id. at 1946–47. 
 109. Id. at 1947; see Defendants’ December 2011 Status Report in Response to 
June 30, 2011 Order, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 LKK JFM P, No. 01-cv-
01351-TEH (E.D. & N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov 
/News/docs/December-3JC-Status-Report.pdf (status report to three-judge court). 
 110. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court affirms 
what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s 
history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 
convicted criminals.”). 
 111. Id. at 1950–51. 
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a judge’s limited role under Article III of the Constitution should 
have prevented this overbroad and “dangerous” injunction.112  The 
PLRA authorized relief so long as it was specific to individual harm, 
and not as a means for influencing systemic reforms and 
micromanaging penal institutions.113  In fact, to Justice Scalia, 
claims of inadequate medical or mental health care violating the 
Eighth Amendment should have required a showing by every single 
member of the plaintiffs in each class.114  Justice Scalia contended 
that because an inmate’s status as prisoner seemingly met the 
threshold requirement for relief under the Eighth Amendment 
due to a claimed systemic deficiency, it relieved plaintiffs of making 
individual showings.115  And a system-wide remedy that would 
release an indiscriminate number of prisoners would be overbroad 
and benefit more inmates than warranted.116 
The majority endorsed the use of a “structural injunction,” 
which recast judges as administrators of societal institutions 
according to Justice Scalia.117  And it rendered judges into 
policymakers as the state had feared.118  Justice Scalia was very 
concerned with judges taking on roles outside their province, 
which was illustrated by the majority’s selective reliance on fact-
finding that was actually policymaking in disguise.119  Ironically, to 
Justice Scalia, this was an instance of misplaced deference to the 
trial court’s findings.120 
In Justice Scalia’s view, this egregious validation of 
incompetent policymaking by judges was compounded by the 
extraordinary remedy of indiscriminately releasing thousands of 
inmates.121  In addition to the public safety risks, the remedy 
trumped lawfully imposed sentences.  The state’s interest in the 
 
 112. Id. at 1951, 1966. 
 113. Id. at 1951. 
 114. Id. at 1952. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1953 (“Most of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions 
or severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens 
who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1953–54. 
 119. Id. at 1954 (“I am not saying that the District Judges rendered their 
factual findings in bad faith.  I am saying that it is impossible for judges to make 
‘factual findings’ without inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual 
findings are policy judgments.”). 
 120. Id. at 1955. 
 121. Id. at 1956. 
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closure and finality of criminal litigation would be undermined by 
this open-ended approach to prisoners’ rights.122  In his view, the 
PLRA was not intended as an instrument for imposing structural 
injunctions, but rather a way of limiting them.123  Justice Scalia 
would have been in favor of specific findings of harm for specific 
prisoners and specific remedies in fulfillment of the statute’s 
“narrowly drawn” requirement.124  Systemic constitutional claims 
were at best rare exceptions under the PLRA.125  Therefore, in his 
opinion, mass release of 46,000 prisoners was threading a needle 
with a sledgehammer without consideration of its impact on society 
at large. 
On the issue of systemic problems, Justice Alito, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts, also dissented because not all “undesirable” 
prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment.126  Inhumane 
but constitutional conditions were not within the province of the 
PLRA.  Justice Alito argued that the three-judge court did not make 
a finding that the “current” prison population levels were 
responsible for the deficits in medical and mental health care.127  
Like Justice Scalia, he would have preferred a remedy that tackled 
the specific problems of those plaintiffs actually harmed by 
inadequate health care facilities.  In his view, the lower court’s 
order was not well-aimed to help those inmates, and painting with 
such a broad brush increased the risk of harm to society through 
the discharge of too many prisoners.128 
Justice Alito’s principal criticisms centered on the three-judge 
court’s refusal to take into account evidence about “current” 
conditions, unwillingness to consider remedies short of mass 
release, and shortsighted treatment of the risks to public safety.129  
The PLRA was intended to address continuing violations that 
existed at the time when a remedy could be ordered.130  According 
to Justice Alito, the trial court relied on outdated information and 
foreclosed the state from introducing new evidence.131  The court’s 
 
 122. Id. (pointing to similar concerns raised in cases where the Court reversed 
grants of habeas corpus by the Ninth Circuit). 
 123. Id. at 1958. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1959–60. 
 130. Id. at 1960. 
 131. Id. 
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choice of remedy was inextricably bound with the present state of 
the problem to be answered.132  And relief for constitutional 
violations was to be evaluated in terms of “present and future, not 
past, conditions.”133  Finally, the remedy of releasing prisoners did 
not directly address the need to improve medical care.134 
As for the State’s proposed remedies, Justice Alito believed 
that they were not given a fair hearing by the three-judge court.  
That court was not evaluating those options in the light of 
conditions at the time the order was issued and thus a less drastic 
alternative might have been viable.135  Also, Justice Alito felt that 
the lower court was more concerned with conditions that violated 
public policy than with determining whether they met minimal 
constitutional requirements.136  In addition, the court did not 
consider remedies that were time delayed.137  Yet, the PLRA did not 
mandate choosing the swifter option, especially when such an 
option was outweighed by the impact on public safety.138  In Justice 
Alito’s opinion, the state could have filled the vacant positions, 
improved their procedures, and purchased the needed supplies 
and equipment without releasing anyone.139  This smaller “targeted 
program,” aimed at repair and expansion of current state facilities, 
seemed more achievable and less risky.140  Even out-of-state 
transfers might have been a viable alternative forestalling the 
court’s resort to the final option of releasing a limited number of 
inmates from the two plaintiff classes.141  
Citing the dangers of mass prisoner releases as “inherently 
risky,” Justice Alito chided the majority for its overreliance on 
deference when it came to assessing the public safety implications 
 
 132. Id. at 1961. 
 133. Id. at 1962.  This reasoning ignores the nature of information gathering.  
Site inspections, commission studies, statistical surveys, and official reporting are 
all time-consuming methods.  While Justice Alito acknowledged that evidence of 
past violations was relevant, he offered no guidance about where to find the type 
of up-to-date information he would have required.  See id.  Unfortunately, there is 
no information system that can provide real-time prison data to the same extent as 
a traffic report or stock market ticker. 
 134. Id. at 1963. 
 135. Id. at 1963–64. 
 136. Id. at 1964. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1965. 
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of the remedy.142  Deference was not always ideal when it came to 
evaluating penology based on expert opinions, which were policy 
oriented, as compared to evaluation of raw facts.143  On this point, 
Justice Alito noted that the increase in the California prison 
population had been accompanied by a drop in the violent crime 
rate—suggesting that crime rates may have decreased due to longer 
prison sentences.144  Thus the opposite might also be true, and 
releasing more prisoners back into society could lead to a rise in 
the crime rate.145  Forecasting a doomsday scenario, Justice Alito 
concluded that the overriding reliance on criminal justice policy as 
opposed to the PLRA’s intuitive policy that mass release orders 
were inherently unsafe would result in a “grim roster of victims.”146 
C.  The Appropriateness of the Majority’s Holding  
For the Supreme Court to issue a decision endorsing the 
seemingly drastic remedy of prison population reduction might 
appear to be judicial overreaching.  But the majority’s opinion was 
consistent with the letter and intent of the PLRA.147  The majority’s 
reasoning showed deference to statutory language and lower court 
findings, and it found that the release order remedy was 
appropriate and necessary under the PLRA’s criteria for relief.148  
The dissenting Justices tagged the majority decision as judicial 
activism because they felt that it improperly deferred to the three-
 
 142. Id. at 1965–67.  Justice Alito referred to the prison cap ordered by a 
federal court for Philadelphia’s prisons and the disastrous result of freeing 
thousands of inmates, after which nearly 10,000 new crimes occurred, including 
violent felonies.  Id. at 1965–66.  Congress had been conscious of this occurrence 
in the early 1990s before the PLRA was enacted.  Id. 
 143. Id. at 1966–67. 
 144. Id.; see supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text for an opposing view. 
 145. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 146. Id. 
 147. The Court’s recent decisions interpreting the PLRA have been faithful to 
the statute’s language and intent to curtail unmeritorious prisoner lawsuits.  See 
generally Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Prison 
Litigation Reform Act—Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. FED.2D 143 (2010) (noting that 
Supreme Court cases interpreting the PLRA have been consistent with the 
legislative goals of limiting the number of prisoner filings and raising the quality 
of suits brought and that the Court has ruled against inmates in most of these 
types of cases). 
 148. See Eighth Amendment: Prison Population Reduction Order—Leading Cases, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 261, 262 (2011) (suggesting that the holding in Brown v. Plata was 
not the result of judicial activism but adherence to the PLRA, state prison 
administrator realities and needs, and the record of conditions found by the three-
judge court). 
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judge court’s findings, which the dissenters deemed policymaking 
in disguise, and argued that the majority ignored the dangerous 
consequences for the public welfare.149  At the same time, it 
appeared that the dissenters selectively disregarded the findings of 
the trial court and employed their own outcome-based assessment 
by repeatedly referring to gloomy predictions that were without 
foundation.150 
For all of these criticisms, the majority stayed true to the 
scheme established in the PLRA, which contemplated the use of 
population limits and reduction as a remedy in the right 
circumstances.  The majority followed the text of the statute, relied 
on the flexibility of the state in its approach to implementing the 
remedy, and relied on the record below without engaging in de 
novo review of the facts.151  Approving the choice of a remedy that 
would order the release of a fixed percentage of prisoners rather 
than parsing out particular cases was the least intrusive and gave 
maximum discretion to prison officials in their choice of actions.152 
The unrestrained overuse of imprisonment inevitably results in 
overcrowding, and overcrowding will always produce the catalog of 
mistreatment, deprivation, suffering, and death revealed in Brown 
v. Plata.153  The three-judge panels convened under the PLRA are 
one step toward ending the cruel conditions of confinement, and a 
long one judging by the number of years that the Plata and Coleman 
plaintiffs pursued their causes.154  Nonetheless, no single decision 
 
 149. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1959–68 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s vague warning to the 
District Court that it should modify the injunction], if successful, would achieve 
the benefit of a marginal reduction in the inevitable murders, robberies, and rapes 
to be committed by the released inmates.”); id. at 1968 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I 
fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim 
roster of victims.  I hope that I am wrong.  In a few years, we will see.”). 
 151. Eighth Amendment: Prison Population Reduction Order—Leading Cases, supra 
note 148, at 267–70. 
 152. Id. at 270. 
 153. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 853–54 (1994) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (“The fact that our prisons are badly overcrowded and 
understaffed may well explain many of the shortcomings of our penal systems.  But 
our Constitution sets minimal standards governing the administration of 
punishment in this country . . . and thus it is no answer to the complaints of the 
brutalized inmate that the resources are unavailable to protect him from what, in 
reality, is nothing less than torture.” (citation omitted)). 
 154. The main purposes of the PLRA are to allow state officials to address 
inmate claims before they reach the court and to filter out prisoner lawsuits to 
assure that only meritorious and unaddressed claims are adjudicated in federal 
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ordering population limits will ever adequately address the system-
wide deficiencies of every prison.  The solution inevitably and 
principally falls on legislatures to change the laws concerning 
incarceration155 that affect local jail populations, sentencing, and 
early release of state prisoners and individuals held in federal 
detention facilities, before court dockets collapse under the weight 
of innumerable writs of habeas corpus.156  And as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Plata, the harm to some inmates can affect all 
inmates due to conditions so pervasive they can only be viewed as 
unconstitutional punishment.157 
IV. BEYOND BROWN V. PLATA: IMPLEMENTING CHANGE THROUGH 
REALIGNMENT 
Acknowledging the fears and worst predictions of the 
dissenters in Brown v. Plata, the state has fashioned a response in 
which no one will be released early.  Before the Supreme Court’s 
decision was issued, California’s Governor Edmund Brown signed 
Assembly Bill 109 (A.B. 109)158 into law, which will channel non-
 
courts.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203–04 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 
81, 83 (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)).  Making prison conditions transparent 
would serve these purposes by allowing officials throughout the criminal justice 
system to address problems before they reach unconstitutional levels. 
 155. See, e.g., Renewing the Promise of Pretrial Justice for All, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., 
http://www.pretrial.org/symposium.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (“[T]oday . . 
. . 500,000 people each day—two out of three of those in our local jails—are 
charged with nonviolent offenses but can’t afford bail.  The cost to taxpayers is $9 
billon each year.”). 
 156. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1956 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia described the need to respect the integrity of criminal sentences and 
compared the problematic majority ruling to the scenario of habeas corpus 
litigation that similarly upsets the state’s interest in the finality of convictions.  Id. 
(“[H]ere, the Court affirms an order granting the functional equivalent of 46,000 
writs of habeas corpus, based on its paean to courts’ ‘substantial flexibility when 
making these judgments.’” (citation omitted)). 
 157. Id. at 1940.  Justice Kennedy pointed out that the scope of the remedy 
under the PLRA fit the scope of the unconstitutional conditions, and was not 
overbroad because it will have the collateral effect of benefitting more prisoners 
than in the plaintiff class.  Id. (“Even prisoners with no present physical or mental 
illness may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are at risk so long as 
the State continues to provide inadequate care.”). 
 158. See A.B. 109, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www. 
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_bill_20110329 
_enrolled.html (effective date Oct. 1, 2011); 2011 Public Safety Realignment Fact 
Sheet, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Fact 
Sheet], http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet 
.pdf (summarizing A.B. 109 and the trailer funding bills). 
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violent, low-level offenders, parolees, and juveniles from state to 
local jails.  This law will prevent new low-risk criminals from 
entering the state system,159 and as for current state prisoners, none 
will be released early.160 
California’s remedial legislation will keep inmates in state 
facilities from being released before their terms are up or before 
their parole is granted in the normal course of events.  The 
alignment aims to staunch the flow of non-violent, non-serious, and 
non-sex offenders into these institutions.161  By shifting 
responsibility to the counties, this legislative response to the 
Court’s unprecedented decision will have an unprecedented ripple 
effect throughout the state’s criminal justice system.  Whether this 
local approach will be cost-effective, tamp down the crime rate, 
integrate with reentry efforts, and result in more humane 
treatment of prisoners remains to be seen.162  Meanwhile, the state’s 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation website has posted 
the equivalent of a stock ticker, publishing “Weekly Population 
Figures” for inmates and parolees.163  This weekly census is an 
important first step in making the conditions of confinement 
transparent.164 
 
 159. See Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor 
Brown Issues Statement on U.S. Supreme Court Ruling (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17046. 
 160. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 1, 3.  According to the Fact Sheet, “No 
inmates currently in state prison will be transferred to county jails or released early.”  Id. at 
1; see also Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor 
Brown Signs Legislation to Improve Public Safety and Empower Local Law 
Enforcement (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16964. 
 161. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 3. 
 162. See, e.g., Sharon Driscoll, Studying Prison Realignment in Real Time, STAN. 
LAW. (Oct. 28, 2011), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2011/10/studying-
prison-realignment-in-real-time/.  While no official plan for studying the outcome 
of A.B. 109 had been included in the legislation, Professor Joan Petersilia at the 
Stanford Criminal Justice Center and students in the Advanced Seminar on 
Criminal Law & Public Policy will undertake a county-level study of the new law’s 
effects in such areas as courtroom dispositions and county jail demographics.  Id.  
 163. See 2011 Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2012). 
 164. The first benchmark after the Supreme Court’s decision and the newly 
implemented state legislation has been a prison population reduction of 8,218 in 
the last quarter of 2011.  See Defendant’s December 2011 Status Report in 
Response to June 30, 2011 Order at 2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 LKK 
JFM P, No. 01-cv-01351-TEH (E.D. & N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/December-3JC-Status-Report.pdf (containing 
the status report to the three-judge court); Julie Small, California Prison Population 
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An important facet of realignment is the creation of 
Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) in each county.165  The 
counties, as the new hubs of a significant portion of felons who 
otherwise would have entered the state prison system, will have to 
assume new responsibilities in this model of local state sentences, 
alternatives to incarceration, and reentry.166  One scholar, noting 
the efficacy of state sentencing commissions across the country, 
regards the CCP as a type of sentencing commission.167  Typically, 
sentencing commissions study and evaluate information about the 
prison population and recidivism rates impacted by changes in 
sentencing laws and practices.168  Before A.B. 109 created the CCPs, 
the special master and receiver appointed in the prison litigation 
cases had filled this role.169 
Under the CCP, California’s fifty-eight counties will oversee 
the administration of sentences and how they will be carried out.170  
The sheriffs in charge of the local jails, some of which have been 
facing their own overcrowding issues, will superintend pretrial 
detainees, defendants convicted of misdemeanors or felonies, and 
parolees who violated the terms of their release.171  Thus, the new 
downstream policy of administering justice will transform local 
correctional centers into one room jailhouses.172  And the crowded 
conditions of those facilities,173 like the overwhelmed state prisons, 
 
Drops by 8,000 Since Realignment, 89.3KPCC (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.scpr.org 
/news/2011/12/16/30375/california-prison-population-dropped-by-8000-since/. 
 165. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 2 (stating that the CCP, already authorized 
under California Penal Code Section 1230, will come up with recommendations to 
the county’s Board of Supervisors on how to implement A.B. 109). 
 166. See id. at 3–4. 
 167. See Robert Weisberg, California’s De Facto Sentencing Commissions, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online 
/californias-de-facto-sentencing-commissions.  
 168. See id. at 3; see also Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned 
Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179 (2007).  See generally NAT’L ASS’N 
SENT’G COMMISSIONS, http://thenasc.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (acting as a 
nonprofit clearinghouse on information “related to sentencing policies, guidelines 
and commissions”). 
 169. Weisberg, supra note 167, at 4–5 (recounting California’s failed attempt to 
create a sentencing commission). 
 170. Id. at 3–4. 
 171. Id. at 6. 
 172. The all-encompassing jailhouse is a truism in a culture where 
incarceration is the default setting for punishment.  Even the idea of alternatives 
to incarceration presupposes that prison is the principal starting point. 
 173. See Richard Winton & Andrew Blankstein, California’s County Jails Struggle 
to House Influx of State Prisoners, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/local/la-me-jails-20111210 (depicting 
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apparently have not been expressly factored into this remedial 
legislation.174 
In addition to this legislative response, a recent decision shows 
how courts might take this post-Plata worldview of the criminal 
justice system into account.  In Thomas v. Schwarzenegger, the inmate 
plaintiff filed a § 1983 civil rights complaint against the state based 
on the same issues as the Brown v. Plata class action: inadequate 
mental, physical, and dental services.175  Considering that the class 
action litigation had already exposed overcrowding as the cause of 
these problems, Thomas bypassed the grievance procedure and 
went directly to court.176  A summary judgment motion was filed, 
claiming that Thomas failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
under the PLRA.177  The district court took into account the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata and the work of the 
state’s Little Hoover Commission178 in bringing these problems to 
light and assigning overcrowding as their principal cause.179  
Therefore, the court held that the state was not in a position to 
claim ignorance of these inhumane conditions,180 and there were 
 
the space problems encountered by local sheriffs faced with a substantial influx of 
new offenders, who otherwise would have gone to state prison, under the Supreme 
Court’s ruling and A.B. 109); Do the Crime, Do the Time? Maybe Not, in California: Jail 
Cell Shortage is Upsetting the Balance, CAL. STATE SHERIFFS’ ASS’N (June 2006), 
http://www.calsheriffs.org/Documents/do_the_crime,_do_the_time.pdf 
(describing the dilapidated state of California’s 460 local jail facilities and the 
overcrowded conditions, which have resulted in escalating pretrial and early 
releases to alleviate the pressures). 
 174. See ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF CAL., COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY 
SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY, SAVING MONEY AND 
WISELY ALLOCATING LIMITED JAIL SPACE 2 (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org 
/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file459_10684.pdf.  Among the twelve 
recommendations for making the best of the opportunity afforded by A.B. 109, 
the ACLU included point number nine: “[e]nsure that jail conditions and 
alternative sanctions meet constitutional standards and are subjected to legal 
review before implementation.”  Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1938 
(2011) (stating that California officials did not pursue the potential remedy of out-
of-state transfers because the Coleman court imposed a requirement that the 
conditions in the receiving institutions satisfied the Eighth Amendment). 
 175. Thomas v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:07-CV-02310 ODW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110067, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011). 
 176. Id. at *1–4. 
 177. Id. at *1. 
 178. See supra note 47; infra note 310. 
 179. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *4–5. 
 180. Id. at *5–6 (“The court might infer that with the level of attention 
surrounding the Coleman and Plata class action suits, prison officials throughout 
the state were keenly aware that prison overcrowding was considered by some to 
be a major contributing factor in the prison system’s inability to deliver minimally 
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triable issues of fact related to their deliberate indifference to those 
conditions.181 
The most immediate impact of Brown v. Plata has been a 
change in the direction of the California penal system towards the 
parsimony principle.182  In a state famous for such punishing and 
prison-inflating measures as the three-strikes law,183 its legislature 
has embraced a sentencing scheme that attempts to limit 
punishment to no more than necessary in low-impact cases.  The 
thrust of A.B. 109 has been to redistribute the penal authority to 
the counties and to control prison populations by diverting non-
violent, non-serious, and non-sex offenders out of the prison 
pipeline.  This step alone serves to cap the state prison punishment 
scheme, thus moderating the sentences formerly imposed on low-
level offenders.  Indirectly, the law will have a consciousness-raising 
effect, because from this point forward, every California judge, 
prosecutor, and defense attorney will be working in a justice system 
reshaped by a remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions. 
Meanwhile, the policymakers in different criminal justice 
systems across the country, from the federal courts down to the 
local justice systems, might be inspired to look in new directions.  
The bud of decarceration philosophy has been espoused in Brown 
v. Plata and implemented by California’s realignment plan.184  
 
adequate medical and mental health treatment to prison inmates.  It had also 
been identified as a cause of increased inmate on inmate violence and posed safety 
concerns to staff as well.  It would have been very surprising if defendants were 
unmindful of either of these two pieces of litigation, the consent decree where the 
state indicated it would reduce prison population, or the lengthy trial before the 
three-judge court.  In fact, ignorance of these events might even be considered a 
deliberate indifference to the conditions of those being held in state custody.”). 
 181. Id. at *8. 
 182. The parsimony principle dictates that punishments should be measured 
proportionate, and no more than needed, to meet the ends of sentencing (i.e., no 
gratuitous suffering).  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”); Sharon Dolovich, 
Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 400–01 (2004) 
(discussing the “parsimony principle, on which in all cases punishment must be no 
more severe than necessary to achieve the relevant deterrent effect”). 
 183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (2012); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 
30 (2003) (holding that California’s three-strikes law, which sent a repeat offender 
convicted of stealing golf clubs to prison for twenty-five years to life, did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment); A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact After More Than a 
Decade, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3 
_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm. 
 184. In fact, there is another attempt at a ballot initiative in California that 
would ameliorate the impact of its three-strikes law in the wake of the realignment.  
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Other states might take the initiative to build on or inaugurate 
efforts along the lines of A.B. 109,185 and to follow-up on such 
measures as resentencing for drug offenders serving excessive 
mandatory minimums.186  Perhaps this viewpoint might inspire 
introspection on the part of society and remind everyone that in a 
nation of laws there are only a few degrees of separation between 
civilians and prisoners.187 
 
See Press Release, Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Three Strikes Initiative Enters 
Circulation (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-
releases/2011/db11-063.pdf.  The success of this ballot proposal, as with 
realignment, will depend on the state’s ability to muster the financial commitment 
to see it through.  See, e.g., Josh Richman, Money Is Gone, but Proposition 36’s Drug-
Treatment Mandate Remains, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2011, available at 2011 
WLNR 3472022.  See generally Prop 36—The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, 
UCLA INTEGRATED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS, http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36 
/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  
 185. See, e.g., Chris Blank, Changes Suggested for Missouri’s Probation and Parole 
System, KANSAS CITY STAR (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:48 AM), http://www.kansascity.com 
/2011/12/17/3327823/changes-suggested-for-missouris.html (discussing the 
Missouri Working Group on Sentencing and Corrections’ recommended changes 
to the state’s parole system, such as providing incentives for compliance, shorter 
or flash punishments for non-violent and technical violators, and the creation of a 
statewide oversight committee); Jessie Halladay, 996 Kentucky Inmates Get Out Early 
in New Prison Plan, COURIER-JOURNAL (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:47 PM), http://www. 
courier-journal.com/article/20111215/NEWS01/312150063/mandatory-re-entry-
prisoners-kentucky?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|Local%20News (discussing a new 
legislative program to grant early release and reentry support to prisoners within 
six-months of their maximum sentence dates; in other words, the legislative 
program provides a special reentry parole for inmates who otherwise would have 
been released with no support or supervision at the end of their terms).  
 186. See, e.g., Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, Governor of N.Y., Governor 
Cuomo Announces Closure of Seven State Prison Facilities (June 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press 
/06302011ClosureOfSevenStatePrisonFacilities (announcing New York prison 
population decreases due to reforms to the Rockefeller mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws and due to a drop in the state’s crime rate); Drug Law Changes, 
N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/drug-law-
reform/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); William Gibney, Drug Law 
Resentencing: Saving Tax Dollars with Minimal Community Risk, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Jan. 
13, 2010), http://www.legal-aid.org/media/127984/drug-law-reform-paper-
2009.pdf.  
 187. This is especially true since millions of people detained pretrial are 
presumed innocent, and those serving time behind bars or on parole or probation 
have connections to family, communities, and the larger society in which we all 
live.  Some scholars have proposed that the distance between public perceptions 
of offenders and life in prison might be bridged by increasing the involvement of 
the public with prisoners.  See, e.g., David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass 
Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 49 (2011) (suggesting that among the ways 
to increase empathy for prisoners and humanize offenders might be to connect 
them with people on the outside through joint activities such as educational or 
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Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Brown v. Plata 
began his analysis with an acknowledgement of a prisoner’s 
personhood and dignity.188  This language adds an important 
statement to the armamentarium of rights that can survive behind 
prison walls.189  And therefore, the ideas of personhood and dignity 
might act reflexively upon sentencing guidelines and trial court 
decisions that accept that the conditions of confinement should be 
a factor in sentencing.190 
 
similar programs).  Scholars have also put forward the idea that bridging this gap 
may reduce recidivism.  See MINN. DEP’T OF CORRS., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON 
VISITATION ON OFFENDER RECIDIVISM 57 (2011), http://www.doc.state.mn.us 
/publications/documents/11-11MNPrisonVisitationStudy.pdf.  Moreover, the 
demographics of arrestees and prisoners continue to change, impacting different 
segments of society.  See, e.g., Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest 
from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25–26 (2012); Erica 
Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/us/nearly-a-third-of-americans-are-arrested 
-by-23-study-says.html (“By age 23, almost a third of Americans have been arrested 
for a crime, according to a new study that researchers say is a measure of growing 
exposure to the criminal justice system in everyday life.”). 
 188. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence 
of human dignity inherent in all persons.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 882–84 (Mont. 2003).  In Walker, the 
Supreme Court of Montana relied on the “human dignity” provision in the state’s 
constitution to address the harm to prisoners caused by behavior management 
plans (BMPs).  See id. The court held that the BMPs and intolerable living 
conditions aggravated the prisoners’ mental health issues and violated their 
“inviolable” right of human dignity under article II, section 4 of the state 
constitution as well as section 22 (comparable to the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment).  See id. at 886. 
 190. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
169, 222–26 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of “dignity” as 
anchors for substantive interests in different contexts; and in particular “collective 
virtue as dignity” that underscores the need for humane treatment of prisoners 
under the Eighth Amendment, specifically taking into account Justice Kennedy’s 
observation in Brown v. Plata); see also HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center for Law and 
Business v. Minister of Finance 34 [2009] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files 
_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf. 
The Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law (no. 28), 5764-2004 (hereafter: 
‘amendment 28’), provides that the State of Israel will establish for the 
first time a (single) prison that will be operated and managed by a private 
corporation rather than by the state.  The arrangement provided in 
amendment 28 leads to a transfer of basic powers of the state in the field 
of law enforcement—imprisonment powers—the exercise of which 
involves a continuous violation of human rights, to a private profit-
making corporation.  As we shall explain below, this transfer of powers 
violates the constitutional rights to personal liberty and human dignity, 
which are enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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V. SMART SENTENCING: OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION AND SENTENCE 
ADJUSTMENT 
With some arm-twisting by the federal courts, California’s 
realignment of criminal justice policy has been implemented.  This 
legislative response was not out of line with an undercurrent of 
existing decisions that have taken advantage of laws permitting 
sentence reductions and alternatives for vulnerable defendants.  
The mental status or physical condition of a defendant can serve as 
a defense to crime (e.g., mental disease or defect or physical 
incapacity) and can mitigate or eliminate punishment,191 and to 
some extent the criminal justice system factors in the sensitivity and 
vulnerability of persons sent into the prison system.192  
The current calculus for setting prison sentences shows the 
complete lack of a consistent rationale underlying penal laws.  Get 
“tough on crime” promises, while having political caché, have 
exposed the inefficacy of lengthening sentences and terminating 
opportunities for early release, hence the “smart on crime” 
approach.193  For example, the Wisconsin legislature has recently 
been embroiled over a debate on whether to cut back on early 
release for its prisoners.194  Considering this development, 
 
 191. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 447–49 (discussing excuse defenses 
based on physical or mental disabilities); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, 
Downward Departure Under State Sentencing Guidelines Permitting Downward Departure 
for Defendants with Significantly Reduced Mental Capacity, Including Alcohol or Drug 
Dependency, 113 A.L.R.5TH 597 (2003); C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Comment 
Note, Mental or Emotional Condition as Diminishing Responsibility for Crime, 22 
A.L.R.3D 1228 (1968). 
 192. See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) (discussing the impact of incarceration on more 
sensitive offenders, the importance of considering subjective experiences, and the 
possibility of calibrating punishments).  
 193. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (Myrna Raeder ed. 
2010) (“One area where the recession has had a major impact is in funding the 
nation’s correctional infrastructure.  The sustained growth of the prison 
population has now become too expensive for a number of states to sustain, which 
many hope will bring a halt to the over-reliance on incarceration.  The slogan that 
we must be ‘smart on crime,’ rather than tough on crime reflects this financial 
reality.”).  
 194. See Malcolm C. Young, Turning Back the Clock on Early Release, THE CRIME 
REP. (June 8, 2011, 3:29 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-
criminal-justice/2011-06-turning-back-the-clock-on-early-release (“Some Wisconsin 
politicians opposed ‘earned early release’ from the start.  Now, with a new 
governor and a shift in control in the legislature, the state’s lawmakers on June 8 
approved a bill repealing Early Release.  Gov. Scott Walker was expected to sign 
the bill shortly thereafter.”).  The Governor signed the bill the following month. 
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Professor Malcolm Young observed that the fundamental problem 
underlying all sentencing practices was based on two main 
causes.195  To start, prison sentence length was not based on 
objective analysis but rather legislative impulsiveness and instinct.196  
The scale of sentences required to protect the public is 
counterbalanced by the need to be “tough on crime” or respond to 
the latest anti-crime campaign.197  Professor Young has also asserted 
that the same ill-defined criteria are relied on by judges meting out 
these sentences.198 
When a court can dole out punishment set in thousands of 
years, what is the rationale underlying such an impossibility?199  
Why set a term of years that no human being could or should 
satisfy?200  It renders the entire sentencing scheme chimerical.201  
 
See Associated Press, Walker Signs Bill Doing Away With Early Release (Update), 
WISLAWJOURNAL.COM (July 19, 2011, 10:35 AM), 
http://wislawjournal.com/2011/07/19/walker-to-sign-repeal-of-early-prison-
release/. 
 195. Young, supra note 194.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Rapists Handed 32,500 Years in Jail, 15 LAW. WKLY. NEWS (Ont., 
Can.), Apr. 26, 1996 (“Allan Wayne McLaurin and Darron Bennalford Anderson 
were convicted of the crimes in 1993, but that decision was overturned by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal because it said the trial judge erroneously instructed the 
jury that a defendant is ‘presumed not guilty,’ rather than ‘presumed innocent.’  
In March, a nine-man, three-woman jury handed Mr. McLaurin a 21,250-year 
sentence, and Mr. Anderson 11,250 years.  A third man is still being sought.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Gabriel Falcon, ‘Lipstick Killer’ Behind Bars Since 1946, CNN (Oct. 
24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-24/justice/illinois.lipstick.murders 
_1_leopold-and-loeb-murderer-longest-serving-inmate?_s=PM:CRIME (“[Denied 
parole numerous times, William Heirens] lives in the present and hopes for a 
future outside prison.  Supporters have championed his cause, convinced that he 
is innocent, or arguing that he has been rehabilitated, a model inmate who has 
served his sentence.”); Joseph Geringer, In the Shadow of Bill Heirens, TRUTV, 
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/predators/heirens/heirens_1.
html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (describing the case of an Illinois man, William 
Heirens, convicted of serial murder and incarcerated since 1946); see also Texas 
Inmate Paroled After 60 Years, KTXS.COM (Dec. 18, 2011, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.ktxs.com/news/30024628/detail.html (discussing Harvey Stewart, an 
eighty-three year old inmate who is to be released on parole after serving sixty 
years in prison—making him Texas’ longest serving offender.  He is no longer 
considered a threat to society according to Corrections officials.).  “When he first 
went to prison in 1951, gasoline was 20 cents a gallon, a postage stamp cost three 
pennies and Harry Truman was [P]resident.”  Id.  The fear of life in prison and its 
torments has on occasion overwhelmed a defendant at the sentencing stage.  See, 
e.g., Jennifer Emily, Man Slits His Throat in Dallas Courtroom After Judge Issues 40-Year 
Sentence, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:58 AM), http://www.dallasnews 
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Indeed, there can be no condign punishments under these laws, 
which leads to the problem of justifying the length and conditions 
of incarcerative punishment. 
Carceral sentencing affects every facet of the person in the 
dock, their personhood202 and roots in the outside world.  And 
achieving mental toughness is no justification for incarcerative 
punishment.  Prison life in general and solitary confinement in 
particular have a corrosive effect on mental wellbeing.203  The fact 
that some persons might have the character to endure the 
hardships of prison life is only a rationalization for the premise that 
prison is appropriate for everyone.  Suffering for its own sake is 
only another ends justifying the means argument.  There is no 
logical or legal support for punishing people because they can take 
it, but there is ample authority for prohibiting invidious 
punishment.204  To borrow a principle from tort law, the justice 
system must take defendants as they find them,205 and the 




 201. See Steven Drizin, Does Rehabilitation Matter Anymore? The Case of William 
Heirens, BLUHM BLOG (July 31, 2007, 10:18 AM), http://blog.law.northwestern.edu 
/bluhm/2007/07/index.html (“For the past 61 years, Heirens has been fighting 
in the courts to establish his innocence.  Although he has come close on several 
occasions, relief has been denied in the courts, by a succession of Governors, and 
by the Parole Boards. . . .  He has been a model prisoner, a jailhouse lawyer who 
has freed many others, an accomplished painter, and was the first inmate to earn a 
four year college degree.  Today, at age 78, Heirens is an obese diabetic who is 
losing his eyesight and is confined to a wheelchair.  He poses no threat to anyone 
and is a good parole risk.”).  
 202. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the 
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.”). 
 203. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 325, 335 (2006); Jeffrey L. Metzner &  Jamie Fellner, Solitary 
Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104–05 (2010); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF 
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/mhppji.pdf. 
 204. See Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Comment Note—Length of Sentence as 
Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 
A.L.R.3D 335 (1970). 
 205. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 31 (2010) (“When an actor’s tortious conduct causes harm to a person 
that, because of a preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics 
of the person, is of a greater magnitude or different type than might reasonably be 
expected, the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all such harm to the 
person.”). 
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endurance of the few, but on the harm to everyone.  The physical 
and mental attributes ignored at sentencing and exacerbated by 
prison conditions are subjecting thousands to penalties far in 
excess of those intended by legislatures, or permitted by the 
constitution. 
The Eighth Amendment by its terms is concerned with 
punishment and not conditions of confinement.206  However, those 
conditions can become punitive when there is a serious deprivation 
and deliberate indifference to suffering behind bars.207  This is the 
fundamental truth acknowledged by Justice Kennedy in Brown v. 
Plata: “To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to 
provide for their own needs.  Prisoners are dependent on the State 
for food, clothing, and necessary medical care.  A prison’s failure to 
provide sustenance for inmates ‘may actually produce physical 
torture or a lingering death.’”208  Thus, when the State defaults on 
its obligation, the courts are obligated to address the State’s 
failure.209 
Judges are also part of the continuum of a justice system whose 
endpoint is the carceral state.  There is an unbroken line from 
arrest to judgment to punishment, putting some of the 
responsibility on the criminal courts’ sentencing practices.210  The 
criminal trial judge’s role is confined to setting a term of years with 
studied indifference to the conditions imposed by delegating to the 
jailer its total administration.211  Conditions of confinement can 
become a categorical punishment as exemplified in Brown v. Plata.  
 
 206. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 885 (2009) (“[I]n the existing system, the crime determines 
only the length of the prison sentence, not the conditions under which that 
sentence will be served.  Indeed, any harm prisoners suffer at the hands of the 
state while incarcerated is typically wholly unrelated to their original offense.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 207. Id. at 891–92 (suggesting that the state has an affirmative duty to protect 
the incarcerated since it is the state that confined them and since the government, 
through legislative and regulatory policies, helped to create this hazardous 
environment, and therefore must bear the “carceral burden”). 
 208. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
 209. Id. at 1928–29. 
 210. See Dolovich, supra note 206, at 900–01. 
 211. Id. at 978 (“Just as prison officials learn cruelty through repeated 
exposure to prisoners in a context that denies their shared humanity, judges 
develop a cruel disposition toward prisoners through the repeated demand that 
they validate as not cruel conditions that are clearly at odds with the state’s 
carceral burden.”). 
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At this point, civil rights litigation forces another court to step in 
and define the proper conditions for incarceration.  The question 
is why punishment is bifurcated in this way.  It results in excessive 
punishment for the incarcerated and added administrative and 
financial burdens for the State to correct problems that could have 
been addressed at sentencing.212  
In view of the conditions engrained in prison life,213 judges 
sometimes exercise their discretion to adjust sentences in 
individual cases to balance the equities.  Perhaps anticipating the 
realignment concept that California has been compelled to 
embrace, some judges have recognized that the conditions of 
confinement amount to a punishment that might fall within the 
proscription of the Eighth Amendment as applied to sentencing.214 
The prison experience and its conditions can be treated as a 
mitigating sentencing factor for susceptible or vulnerable 
individuals.215  There have been exceptions where a sentencing 
 
 212. Cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 140 n.* (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“A prisoner’s sentence is the punishment imposed pursuant to state 
law.  Sentencing a criminal to a term of imprisonment may, under state law, carry 
with it the implied delegation to prison officials to discipline and otherwise 
supervise the criminal while he is incarcerated.  Thus, restrictions imposed by 
prison officials may also be a part of the sentence, provided that those officials are 
not acting ultra vires with respect to the discretion given them, by implication, in 
the sentence.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1350 (6th Cir. 1974) (“Courts take 
judicial notice that a general prison population includes criminals of all types, 
young and old, dangerous, of every character.  And the courts also particularly 
take judicial notice that it is not uncommon to find the indiscriminate mixing of 
hardened criminals, including sexual assaulters, with young offenders.”); United 
States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In this district, defendants 
are detained prior to and during trial in the Metropolitan Correction Center, 
alongside criminals incarcerated subsequent to conviction pursuant to due process 
of law.  Overcrowded conditions were observed by this court in the course of its 
inspection of the Center.  Visiting hours and recreation are quite restricted.  
Moreover, opportunities to meet with counsel and to examine tapes and written 
documents, and to assist in preparation for trial, are severely limited.  The court 
may take judicial notice of such prison conditions affecting the administration of 
justice.”). 
 214. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 10−12 (examining the common factors 
that state courts with a body of “proportionality jurisprudence” have developed to 
adjust sentences that are out of step with the principles of fair punishment); 
Kennard R. Strutin, Mandatory Minimums, Life Sentences and the Eighth Amendment, 
N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1994, at 6. 
 215. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that one of the proportionality 
factors that courts have considered is the defendant’s criminal history, which 
might be characterized as a “worthiness factor”).  The defendant’s “worthiness” for 
sentencing consideration is broader than his rap sheet.  Thus, the concepts of 
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guideline recognizes or a sentencing judge has recognized the 
“cruel and unusual” nature of prison by adjusting the punishment 
of particular offenders or taking into account the effects of the 
conditions of confinement on susceptible defendants.216  Indeed, it 
is these exceptions that provide the foundation for a 
reconceptualization of incarcerative punishment catalyzed by the 
California realignment example.  The State of California 
reinvented its sentencing laws in response to its prison population 
problem, thereby informing and educating everyone in the 
criminal justice system that conditions of confinement do matter in 
setting punishment.  They siphoned away non-violent, non-serious, 
and non-sex offenders from state prison facilities.  While their 
rationale was formulated to satisfy a court-ordered population 
reduction, the reality is a recognition that some persons should not 
be sentenced to state prison or any prison.  This conclusion has 
already been reached by federal and state courts by taking into 
account the “individual” character of the man or woman in the 
dock and cognizance of the nature of the prison environment. 
Federal law recognizes that there is room for individualized 
sentencing to arrive at an appropriate sentence.217  Information 
that might reveal a defendant’s vulnerability inside prison is 
especially important at the pretrial stage.  One of the factors in 
setting a penalty is whether the prison facility can provide a 
defendant with adequate medical care.218  The level of health care 
available and the conditions of prison life should be determinative 
in the length of an incarcerative sentence due to their impact on 
 
dignity and personhood, which go beyond his criminal background or 
vulnerability to harm, are facets that ought to be encompassed in a worthiness 
factor analysis.  See discussion supra notes 188−90 and accompanying text.  
 216. See Kolber, supra note 192, at 193−95; see, e.g., Lise Olsen, Former Federal 
Judge Kent Calls Prison Unfair, ‘Cruel’, CHRON.COM (Aug. 3, 2010, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Former-federal-judge-Kent-
calls-prison-unfair-1718673.php (“As a prisoner, former U.S. District Judge Samuel 
B. Kent has been shunted into solitary confinement, forced to hear the screams of 
another inmate being raped and ordered by a ‘cruel’ sergeant in the Florida 
prison system to do calisthenics in the nude, according to allegations in a federal 
court memorandum filed Tuesday.  Kent has requested that his 33-month 
sentence be vacated and adjusted based on his allegations of inhumane and unfair 
treatment.”). 
 217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006) (“No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person 
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). 
 218. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2006). 
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the defendant,219 as prison has the potential of transforming 
routine medical matters into the extraordinary by virtue of the 
conditions inside.  
One author has cataloged the variety of ailments and medical 
conditions that have justified deviation from the formerly 
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines.220  And yet, the 
Guidelines’ downward departures were seldom invoked for these 
reasons.221  After a series of cases dethroned the Guidelines, the 
issue of a defendant’s physical condition as an element of 
sentencing has been litigated case-by-case.222  Still, it is through the 
lessons garnered from these individual cases that reforms in the 
sentencing guidelines and procedures might find fruition.223  
Ultimately, policymakers have forced the courts to resolve the 
tension between improving prison conditions and making 
exceptions under the sentencing laws in individual cases, 
forestalling the need for widespread reforms.224  California has 
 
 219. See generally Penelope June Weller, The Right to Health: The Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 35 ALTERNATIVE. L.J. 66 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935746 (discussing the Australian government’s 
positive obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health of people in 
custody). 
 220. See Stacey M. Studnicki, Individualized Sentencing: Federal Sentencing 
Departures Based Upon Physical Condition, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1215, 1224, 1233−41 
(1994).  
 221. Id. at 1217−18. 
 222. See generally Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Downward Departure Under § 5H1.4 
of United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Permitting Downward Departure for 
Extraordinary Physical Impairment, 16 A.L.R. FED. 2D 113 (2007) (“The fact that a 
defendant has an illness, disease, or condition by itself does not constitute an 
extraordinary physical impairment.  It is the extent to which the illness, disease, or 
condition has progressed, and the extent to which the Bureau of Prisons has the 
medical personnel and facilities required to furnish a defendant with the care and 
treatment he or she needs that will generally control.”). 
 223. Studnicki, supra note 220, at 1245 (footnote omitted) (“If courts fail to 
depart on the belief that a departure is not permissible, the Sentencing 
Commission may interpret this ‘judicial inaction as endorsement of the 
appropriateness of the sentences scheduled under the Guidelines.’  In order to 
guide future Guidelines’ amendments, the courts are obligated to create a record 
so the Commission may see that departures, especially on the basis of 
individualized factors, are appropriate and necessary.”).  
 224. See generally Alice Ristroph, Model Penal Code Symposium: How (Not) to Think 
Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009) (discussing Model Penal Code 
approaches to sentencing and the need for a judge-centered pragmatic sentencing 
approach unshackled by retributivist (punishment) policies); Simon N. M. Young, 
Justifying Sentencing Discounts for Foreigners, 31 H.K. L.J. 369 (2001) (discussing the 
hardships experienced by foreign defendants serving time in Hong Kong jail as a 
factor in sentence mitigation, which should be accommodated through a 
39
Strutin: The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing Reform an
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
1352 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
chosen a third approach by staunching the flow of offenders into 
the state prison system and moving them into the local jail system, 
using home monitoring, or utilizing other alternative avenues, and 
despite the Supreme Court’s order, has avoided releasing current 
state prisoners or even transferring them to local facilities.225  
Pursuing a realignment approach to its fullest extent, in order to 
avoid the unconstitutional consequences of overcrowding in state 
prisons, could lead to a system where every individual facing 
incarceration would receive a medical and mental evaluation as 
part of the presentence report preparation and could introduce 
expert testimony at a sentencing hearing to advise the court about 
the best disposition and placement (classification) of that individual 
within the penal system or a non-carcerative alternative.226 
The conditions in prison are also reflected, perhaps 
intensified, in the local jails where defendants are held temporarily 
awaiting disposition, serve short sentences, and await transfer to 
prison for longer terms.227  As noted earlier, this might become an 
important factor in the implementation of California’s realignment 
plan, which calls for extensive reliance on local facilities in lieu of 
state prisons. 
The catalog of issues in local jails touches all aspects of an 
inmate’s life, much as it would in state prisons.  One challenge 
faced by inmates is the conundrum facing large persons due to the 
inadequacy of the jailhouse diet and the difficulty of inhabiting 
cramped living spaces.228  In Arkansas, an inmate awaiting trial filed 
 
proportionality analysis). 
 225. See Get Ready, California Counties, Here Come the Inmates, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-re-entry-
20110830 (observing that rehabilitation and reentry get little attention as 
California counties struggle with the financial consequences of the new legislative 
mandate to route more prisoners through local jails and community facilities).  
 226. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
as to Appropriate Punishment for Convicted Defendant, 47 A.L.R.4TH 1069 (1986) 
(analyzing state and federal cases that discuss the admissibility of expert or 
psychiatric testimony affecting criminal sentencing). 
 227. See TODD D. MINTON, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim10st.pdf (describing national jail 
populations and the various purposes served by incarceration in local facilities 
(e.g., awaiting trial or disposition, temporary holding for parole and probation 
violators, or serving short-term sentences)). 
 228. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. 
L. REV. 639, 687–88 (1993) (collecting decisions where the problematic living 
conditions in jails, as well as prisons, have been litigated); Lizette Alvarez, Soy Diet 
Is Cruel and Unusual, Florida Inmate Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A13; Tovin 
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a lawsuit claiming that the detention center diet was so deficient 
that he was “literally being starved to death.”229  Physical or mental 
issues can render someone unfit for prison because he is already 
confined by his body or mind.230 
Vulnerability to cruel punishment, a front-end Eighth 
Amendment argument, reflects the fears and realities of prison 
conditions present in all cases and acknowledged by the Court in 
Plata.  These are chronic conditions faced by inmates and those to 
be sentenced to incarceration.  Thus, legislatures might account 
for, a court could take judicial notice of, or a defense lawyer might 
raise awareness of, the full spectrum of prison life: susceptibility to 
abuse;231 sexual abuse and rape;232 poor living conditions;233 
 
Lapan, When Inmates Act Out, the Loaf Is Served, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Dec. 17, 
2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/rss/ci_16886434 (describing 
correctional officials’ use of “disciplinary diet loaf, prison loaf and management 
loaf” to punish misbehaving inmates).  
 229. See 300-Pound Inmate Complains Ark. Jail Doesn’t Feed Him Well, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 28, 2008, 10:55 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-04-
28-2668992449_x.htm (“Broderick Lloyd Laswell says he isn’t happy that he’s 
down to 308 pounds after eight months in the Benton County jail.  He has filed a 
federal lawsuit complaining the jail doesn’t provide inmates with enough food. . . . 
‘If we are in a small pod all day (and) do next to nothing for physical exercise, we 
should not lose weight,’ the suit says.  ‘The only reason we lost weight in here is 
because we are literally being starved to death.’”).  However, under the federal 
sentencing guidelines in the United States, morbid obesity does not automatically 
qualify as an “extraordinary physical impairment” for a downward departure 
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Washington, 467 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying an application for downward 
sentence departure based on the defendant’s weight loss from about 800 pounds 
at arrest to 574 pounds at sentencing). 
 230. See, e.g., Paul Sims, Agoraphobic Who Made So Much in Benefits He Ran Illegal 
Loans Business Escapes Trial Because He’s ‘Scared To Leave His House’, MAILONLINE 
(June 22, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2006390 
/Middlesborough-man-Colin-Watson-got-benefits-cash-lent-friends-escapes-trial-
hes-scared-leaving-home.html (“His agoraphobia was said to be so bad he cannot 
leave his one-bedroom home to go to court and the case against him was 
reluctantly dropped by Judge Peter Fox, QC.”). 
 231. See, e.g., United States v. Parish, 308 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A 
defendant’s unusual susceptibility to abuse by other inmates while in prison may 
warrant a downward departure.  The district court found that Parish was 
susceptible to abuse in prison because of a ‘combination’ of factors: ‘his stature, 
his demeanor, his naivete, [and] the nature of the offense.’” (citations omitted)). 
 232. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE OF FEDERAL INMATES (2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0504/final.pdf (critiquing the deficiencies in 
federal laws criminalizing prison staff sexual relations with inmates); ALLEN J. BECK 
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09 6 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf (“Among the 76,459 
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psychological harm;234 geriatric related problems;235 and inhumane 
treatment by officials.236  Other illustrative bases for exceptions to 
incarcerative punishment and acknowledgement of the conditions 
of confinement have been found in the following areas: sexual 
targets;237 sexual orientation and gender reassignment;238 ability to 
 
inmates participating in the NIS-2 sexual victimization survey, 2,861 reported 
experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization in the past 12 months, 
or since admission to the facility, if less than 12 months.”). 
 233. See, e.g., David B. Caruso, Anne Hathaway’s Ex-Boyfriend Not Enjoying Prison, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 13, 2008, 11:22 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html 
/entertainment/2008386905_apvaticamscamfollieri.html (“[Raffaello] Follieri’s 
lawyer sent a letter to a judge this week complaining about the facility.  ‘Mr. 
Follieri reports that he is in a windowless dormitory with approximately 120 other 
men,’ the letter said.  ‘He says that he cannot eat because the food appears to be 
spoiled and that the toilet and shower facilities are unspeakably unsanitary[,] e.g., 
there is excrement in the shower and rats are roaming freely in the area.  He says 
the stench is intolerable.’  The lawyer, Flora Edwards, said things are so bad, it has 
made Follieri ill.  So far he has had a fever, blood in his urine, intestinal problems 
and shortness of breath.  Edwards asked the judge to have the 30-year-old 
transferred back to the federal jail in Manhattan where he was previously held.  
The judge asked the government to look into Follieri’s complaints.”). 
 234. See Jeffrey Kluger, Are Prisons Driving Prisoners Mad?, TIME (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1582304,00.html (“The U.S. 
holds about 2 million people under lock and key, and 20,000 of them are confined 
in the 31 supermaxes operated by the states and the Federal Government.  That 
may represent only 1% of the inmate population, but it’s a volatile 1%.  Push any 
punishment too far and mental breakdown—or at least a claim of mental 
breakdown—is sure to follow.”). 
 235. See generally John D. Burrow & Barbara A. Koons-Witt, Elderly Status, 
Extraordinary Physical Impairments and Intercircuit Variation Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 11 ELDER L.J. 273 (2003) (proposing that prisoners’ elderly status be 
considered as part of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Timothy Curtin, The 
Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison Population and the Search for a Cost-
Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007) 
(evaluating the challenges of accommodating elderly inmates). 
 236. See, e.g., Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 2010) (involving a § 
1983 action filed by a pretrial detainee against local sheriff for transporting him 
from the court to the jail in a dog cage in a K-9 vehicle); Johnson Frees Woman 
Abused by Jail Guards, FREE REPUBLIC (May 31, 2002, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/692629/posts (“Gov. Gary Johnson 
took the rare step Thursday of commuting the six-year sentence of an inmate—a 
woman sexually assaulted by Doña County jail guards while incarcerated for credit-
card fraud.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Jail a Risk for Thin, White Man, Judge Rules, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 
7, 2001, at B-5 (“Hillsborough County Judge Florence Foster sent Paul Hamill, 41, 
to a treatment center and put him on two years’ probation.  He was being 
sentenced for violating probation on a previous cocaine conviction.  ‘He’s a small, 
thin, white man with curly dark hair, and I suspect he would certainly become a 
sexual target in the Florida state prison system,’ Foster said, according to a 
transcript of the November sentencing hearing.  ‘I’ve been told they can’t protect 
people like that.  I’m not going to send a man like this to Florida state prison.  
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pay;239 costs of incarceration;240 youth;241 physical challenges;242 
 
That is cruel and unusual punishment in my book,’ she said.”); see also Robert 
Gavin, Cruel, but Not Unusual, TIMES UNION, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?oneimage&imageid=1
0070757 (“Behind the walls of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, less than 75 
miles from the state Capitol, an old stereotype remains hauntingly true: Go to 
prison, risk rape.  The maximum-security lockup in Washington County ranked 
fifth worst nationwide in the most recent study of the prevalence of sexual assault 
in U.S. prisons—and convicted criminals housed there were only part of the 
problem.”).  See generally United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 525–26 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“At sentencing, the court found that Gonzalez had a ‘feminine cast to his 
face and a softness of features which will make him prey to the long-term criminals 
with whom he will be associated in prison.’  Relying on our decision in United States 
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990), which held that ‘extreme vulnerability of a 
criminal defendant is a proper ground for departure,’ the court concluded that a 
downward departure was appropriate to ensure Gonzalez’s safety, and therefore 
reduced Gonzalez’s sentence to one-third of the normally applicable minimum 
term.” (citation omitted)). 
 238. See, e.g., Jail for Gay, Transgender Inmates to Close, USA TODAY (Dec. 29, 
2005, 7:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-12-29-rikers-
inmates_x.htm (“One of the nation’s few jail dormitories specifically for gay or 
transgender prisoners is closing on Rikers Island, prompting complaints from 
some activists who say it is a needed safe haven.”); Purna Nemani, Woman Locked in 
a Men’s Prison, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 8, 2010), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/12/08/32413.htm (“A hermaphrodite 
who underwent surgery to become a woman claims Hawaii incarcerated her in a 
men’s prison where she was, predictably, raped.  The 33-year-old woman says the 
state locked her up in its largest men’s prison despite her repeated protests during 
intake that she is a woman.”); Tom Whitehead, Transsexual Prisoner Wins Right to Be 
in Female Prison, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2009, 1:35 PM), http://www.telegraph 
.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/6138325/Transsexual-prisoner-wins-right-to-
be-in-female-prison.html (“Lawyers for the 27-year-old inmate, who is still at the 
preoperative stage, described her as a ‘woman trapped inside a man’s body’ and 
argued keeping her among men was preventing her from having a full sex 
change.”).  
 239. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/us/29jail.html 
?pagewanted=all (“For roughly $75 to $127 a day, these [California] convicts—who 
are known in the self-pay parlance as ‘clients’—get a small cell behind a regular 
door, distance of some amplitude from violent offenders and, in some cases, the 
right to bring an iPod or computer on which to compose a novel, or perhaps a 
song.”).  See generally Symposium, Pay-to-Stay Programs in Correctional Facilities, 106 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org 
/assets/fi/106/paytostay.pdf. 
 240. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/19judges.html 
?pagewanted=all (“For someone convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, 
for instance, a judge might now learn that a three-year prison sentence would run 
more than $37,000 while probation would cost $6,770.  A second-degree robbery, 
a judge could be told, would carry a price tag of less than $9,000 for five years of 
intensive probation, but more than $50,000 for a comparable prison sentence and 
parole afterward. The bill for a murderer’s 30-year prison term: $504,690.”); 
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stature;243 coercive nature of pretrial detention;244 and family ties.245  
 
Jennifer Medina, In California, a Plan to Charge Inmates for Their Stay, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/us/in-riverside-california-
a-plan-to-charge-inmates.html (“Soon, a twin metal bunk at the county jail, with 
meals served on plastic trays, will run $142.42.”); see also Annual Determination of 
Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,081 (proposed Sept. 15, 2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-15/pdf/2011-23689.pdf 
(containing the Department of Justice’s average cost of incarceration for the year 
2010); Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of 
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963506 (advocating for judges 
taking financial costs into consideration when sentencing); Chad Flanders, Cost as 
a Sentencing Factor: A Theoretical Inquiry, (Saint Louis Univ. Legal Studies Research, 
Working Paper No. 2011-23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920274 
(discussing whether Missouri judges should take the cost of incarceration into 
consideration when sentencing).  
 241. See, e.g., United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“This case illustrates some of the troubling problems in sentencing adolescents 
who download child pornography on a file-sharing computer service.  Posed is the 
question: To protect the public and the abused children who are shown in a 
sexually explicit manner in computer images, do we need to destroy defendants 
like C.R.?”). 
 242. See, e.g., Dan Herbeck, Quadriplegic Spared Prison in Child Porn Case, 
BUFFALONEWS.COM (Aug. 20, 2010, 6:42 PM), http://www.buffalonews.com 
/incoming/article130071.ece (“43-year-old Allegany County man who was using a 
credit card to buy images from child porn Web sites: Schifelbine is a quadriplegic.  
He cannot walk, requires 24-hour nursing care and spends all his time in his bed 
or wheelchair.  After hearing about his physical disabilities, U. S. Attorney 
Terrance P. Flynn decided to offer the Belmont man an agreement that would 
carry no criminal conviction or prison time.  Schifelbine, however, will forfeit 
$50,000 to the federal government and his use of the Internet will be restricted.”). 
 243. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 735 N.W.2d 818, 830 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Thompson stands 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighs 125 to 130 pounds.  
Thompson’s size and how that ‘physical condition’ will affect him in a prison 
setting is a relevant consideration.  However, given other matters found in the PSI, 
which matters we will detail shortly, we have no doubt that Thompson’s physical 
stature, although specifically mentioned, was but a minor point in the trial court’s 
sentencing decision.”); Scott Bauer, Sentence for Short Sex Offender Draws Fire, WASH. 
POST (May 26, 2006, 10:50 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052600177.html (“Cheyenne County 
District Judge Kristine Cecava . . . told Richard W. Thompson that his crimes 
deserved a long prison sentence but that he was too small to survive in a state 
prison.  Joe Mangano, secretary of the National Organization of Short Statured 
Adults, agreed with the judge’s assessment that Thompson would face dangers 
while in prison because of his height.”).  
 244. See, e.g., United States v. Joyeros, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“This case illustrates the danger of due process violations by intensive pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty because of lengthy pretrial incarcerations and the offer 
of advantageous deals for lesser terms of imprisonment.”); United States v. Francis, 
129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted) (“Although 
departures based on conditions of confinement are not encouraged by the 
Guidelines, they also are not discouraged; in fact, conditions of confinement is an 
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This proliferation of problems argues in favor of a general 
realignment like the one pursued in California.  Indeed, these 
individual issues cumulatively reflect the need to broadly realign 
sentencing to avoid punitive conditions in federal and state prisons. 
Thus, new policies ought to broadly and consistently allow for the 
consideration of individual risk factors in conjunction with the 
disclosure and consideration of prison conditions at the sentencing 
stage.246 
VI. EFFECTUATING THE EXPOSURE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
While not everyone will have the same prison experience, they 
will face the same conditions upon arrival.  And those conditions 
are a direct result of the sentence imposed.  As the cases below 
illustrate, judges have little or no power to affect those conditions.  
Until there is a merger between the penal law governing 
punishment and the corrections statutes superintending prison 
administration, judges can only set and pronounce numerical 
sentences.247  Ultimately, the better policy might involve the 
 
unmentioned factor . . . .Therefore, conditions of confinement below those in 
federal institutions provide grounds for a departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.”). 
 245. See, for example, the cases collected in United States v. Bailey, 369 F. 
Supp. 2d 1090, 1101–03 (D. Neb. 2005) (“Thus, although family ties are ordinarily 
not relevant, once in a great while they provide a reason for a reduced sentence.”). 
 246. The intensity of punishment should be considered for particular cases 
such as victim-defendants—for example, victims of domestic violence who in turn 
have been charged with crimes against their abusive spouses or partners.  
According to one study the majority of incarcerated women are “survivor-
defendants.”  See, e.g., CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. AVON GLOBAL CTR. FOR WOMEN AND 
JUSTICE & THE WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASS’N OF N.Y., 
FROM PROTECTION TO PUNISHMENT: POST-CONVICTION BARRIERS TO JUSTICE FOR 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVOR-DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK STATE (2011), available at 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/From-Protection-to-
Punishment-Report.pdf (addressing the injustices victim-defendants face within 
the legal system).  This has led to the introduction of legislation in New York to 
adjust the sentence to fit the offender (i.e., institutionalized leniency).  See S. Res. 
5436, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://m.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bill/S5436-2011 (relating to sentencing and resentencing in 
domestic violence cases); Shorter Prison Time Sought for Abused Women in NY, 
LONGISLANDPRESS.COM (June 13, 2011), http://www.longislandpress.com/2011 
/06/13/shorter-prison-time-sought-for-abused-women-in-ny/.  This is the first 
legislation of its kind to remove impediments to sentencing that have not been 
remedied by clemency grants or early release on parole. 
 247. See discussion supra Part V. 
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consultation with or appointment of special sentencing counsel248 
or requirement of a corrections consultant as in death penalty 
cases249 where the sentence plays a central role.  However, that 
policy must begin with legislation that empowers and enables trial 
judges to be informed about the effects of the prison sentences that 
they impose.  Such a policy should give judges reasonable 
discretion to modify that sentence or have input into a defendant’s 
classification within the correctional system, as the realignment 
approach discussed above would allow.  The interconnectedness of 
penal sentences and prison conditions might best be shown by 
examining interactions between courts and correctional authorities 
as judges attempt to consider the prison environment in 
determining how a defendant ought to serve his or her time.250 
A. Judges and Jailers 
In 1983, Ernesto “Tony” Insignares was indicted for selling less 
than two ounces of cocaine to an undercover New York City police 
officer.251  The judge released him on $200.00 bail.252  At trial, 
Insignares took the witness stand and claimed that he was only 
 
 248. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien, 
the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse 
consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an 
immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.” (emphasis added)); 
Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The 
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 
(2011) (exploring the rights to specialized counsel in deportation cases); STEERING 
COMM. OF THE N.Y. IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY REPORT ET AL., ACCESSING 
JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 
6-14 (2011), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo 
/NYIRS_Report.pdf. 
 249. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
as to Appropriate Punishment for Convicted Defendant, 47 A.L.R.4TH 1069 (1986) 
(discussing the admissibility for sentencing purposes of expert evidence on 
circumstances of dangerousness); Jules Epstein, Mandatory Mitigation: An Eighth 
Amendment Mandate to Require Presentation of Mitigation Evidence, Even When the 
Sentencing Trial Defendant Wishes to Die, TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928052. 
 250. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 29.  Legislatures cannot predict the 
innumerable ways that penal and sentencing laws might be applied, resulting in 
some contradictory and conflicting outcomes, but a law that empowered judges to 
take proportionality into account would go a long way toward addressing this 
conundrum.  Id. 
 251. See People v. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983). 
 252. Id. 
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delivering the package on behalf of a friend, his co-defendant, and 
was unaware that it contained illegal drugs.253  Nonetheless, the jury 
convicted him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the 
second degree.254  At this point, presiding Justice Hornblass 
remanded Insignares to Rikers Island until sentencing as was 
required by law.255  Based on his observations of the defendant 
during trial, the judge became concerned about Insignares’ ability 
to endure jail, so he ordered the correction officers to place him in 
administrative segregation and on a suicide watch.256 
Once in Rikers Island, the defendant was placed in a holding 
pen along with two dozen other inmates.257  Insignares picked out a 
corner of the cell and went to sleep.258  Soon after, he was sexually 
assaulted by five other prisoners who also threatened his life should 
he reveal what happened.259  At his next court appearance several 
days later, Insignares told the court about it, as well as a failed 
suicide attempt after the attack.260  Confirming these claims, Justice 
Hornblass was disturbed that the New York Department of 
Corrections had ignored his custody orders.261  They believed the 
court exceeded its authority over a matter solely within the 
bailiwick of prison administration.262 
A turf war broke out.  The court ordered Insignares 
transferred to Bellevue Hospital for observation; however, the 
Commissioner of Corrections obtained a superseding order from 
the administrative judge to keep the defendant in Rikers Island 
Hospital.263  Discovering the change in his orders, Justice Hornblass 
visited the defendant at Rikers and reviewed the scene of his earlier 
attack.264  Meanwhile, Insignares’ attorney filed a Clayton motion265 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.40(3) (2011). 
 256. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 515. 
   257.     Id. at 516. 
   258.     Id.   
 259. Id. (“Two of the inmates silenced and held him down on the floor while 
the other three forcibly sodomized him anally.”). 
   260.     Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.  A Clayton motion appeals to the discretionary power of the criminal 
court to dismiss an indictment “in furtherance of justice.”  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
210.40(1) (2011).  It is an equitable option that allows the court to dismiss a case 
even where no reason exists “as a matter of law.”  Id.  To rectify an injustice 
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to dismiss the conviction against him in the interests of justice 
based on the sexual assault in Rikers.266  The court conducted an 
exhaustive hearing that produced more than 2,100 pages of 
transcripts.267 
The yard stick for a Clayton motion is fairness.268  Applying the 
statutory criteria, Justice Hornblass reviewed Insignares’ character 
and personal history and found them to be admirable.269  Then he 
considered any misconduct by law enforcement before and after 
conviction.270  Most notable was the Department of Corrections’ 
failure to abide by the judge’s order for the defendant’s safety and 
well-being.  He noted:  
Inmates have a due process right secured by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments that entails reasonable 
protection from acts of violence and sexual assault 
perpetrated by fellow inmates.  Prison officials have a 
correlative duty to exercise “reasonable care to prevent 
prisoners from intentionally harming others or from 
creating an unreasonable risk of harm.”271 
Balancing the rights of prisoners with the duties of prison 
officials to oversee their safety, along with the Department of 
Corrections’ refusal to take precautions specifically requested by 
the court, Justice Hornblass concluded that Insignares was entitled 
to be kept safe from harm while inside prison walls and that the 
Department of Corrections had a higher duty because there was a 
court order requiring additional precautions, which it failed to 
follow.272 
Another important criterion considered by the court was the 
purpose and effect of the sentence.  A number of experts appeared 
 
without a legal remedy, the judge must find a “compelling factor” from among the 
ten statutory criteria, which address the seriousness of the crime, defendant’s 
background, impact on the community and the justice system, and most notably 
“the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized 
for the offense.”  Id.; see also People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1973).  See generally John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York’s “Interests of 
Justice” Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175 (1994) (discussing New York’s unique 
“dismissal in the interests of justice” application in the overloaded criminal justice 
system). 
 266. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 516. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See id. at 517. 
 269. Id. at 517–18. 
 270. Id. at 518. 
 271. Id. (citation omitted). 
 272. Id. 
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at the hearing to discuss the impact of prison conditions, including 
two court-appointed psychiatrists. 273  They testified that Insignares 
lacked the survival skills required for prison life and that the 
punishment he had already endured was sufficient deterrence; 
moreover, continued incarceration would result in mental trauma 
and the need for psychiatric care.274  The prosecution experts 
presented contrary testimony founded mainly on their disbelief 
that the defendant had been sexually assaulted.275  Justice 
Hornblass found that defendant’s experiences in jail were a 
sufficient deterrent to future criminality, his victimization by other 
inmates harmed him physically and psychologically, the spotlight 
shone on his case increased his vulnerability to attack while in 
Rikers, and that he was no longer mentally able to survive the 
prison experience.276  Since the rape occurred while Insignares was 
a pretrial detainee and thus at a time where he was under the 
control of the Department of Corrections, it became a crucial 
sentencing factor.277  Finally, the court rejected prosecution 
arguments that the rape never happened.278 
The conduct of the Departmen of Corrections and the 
physical and psychological injuries inflicted on Insignares 
compelled Justice Hornblass to dismiss the indictment.279  The 
judge was satisfied that the mandatory three years to life in prison 
was unnecessary in light of the time already served (nine months in 
Rikers) and defendant’s experiences.280  The court explained its 
rationale in light of the greater purposes of punishment and its 
societal benefits: (1) defendant had been sexually attacked in jail 
awaiting sentence, (2) Insignares, like anyone convicted of a crime, 
had the right to expect “humane confinement,” (3) his treatment 
in jail went beyond the scope of any lawful penalty, (4) the danger 
to the defendant would have been preventable if the Department 
of Corrections had followed the court’s order, and (5) Insignares 
 
 273. Id. (“Prison administrators, social scientists, and other experts in the field 
of penology testified to prison conditions generally and how the defendant would 
fare in the prison environment.”). 
 274. Id. at 519. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 519–20. 
 277. Id. at 519 (“‘The infliction of punishment, particularly where its severity 
serves no valid penological purpose, is cruel and inhuman.’” (quoting People v. 
Askew, 403 N.Y.S.2d 959, 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978))). 
 278. Id. at 519–20. 
 279. Id. at 521. 
 280. Id. at 520. 
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suffered long-term emotional and psychological harm as a result.281 
This decision was reversed on appeal and remanded for 
resentencing.282  The Appellate Division believed that Justice 
Hornblass abused his discretion in dismissing the indictment by 
failing to evaluate the Clayton evidence fairly as between the State 
and the defendant.283  Their reevaluation of the criteria led to a 
different result.  The appellate court found that crime was more 
serious and detrimental to the community than the trial court 
described, and evidence of Insignares’ participation in the drug 
sale was overwhelming.284  Moreover, the post-conviction 
misconduct by the Department of Corrections had no bearing on 
the sentence.285  This last point was the most important, as the 
court held that there was no relation to the harm inflicted on 
Insignares while in custody and his sentence; there was no room for 
discretion to relieve him of his mandatory punishment.286  His only 
remedies were a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the Department of Corrections or a request for administrative 
segregation.287  
The trial judge in Insignares attempted to take into account the 
infliction of harms caused by jail and prison conditions in order to 
arrive at an equitable result.  Extending the harm of incarceration 
for Insignares to a minimum of three years, as mandated by state 
law, seemed counterproductive in view of the defendant’s character 
and suffering.  However, on appeal, the War on Drugs took 
precedence—a war that has played a significant role in prison 
inflation.288 The defendant’s participation in the selling of cocaine 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. See People v. Insignares, 491 N.Y.S.2d 166, 175–76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
 283. Id. at 173. 
 284. Id. at 174. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 175. 
 288. See generally Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug 
War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 17–18 
(2010) (footnotes omitted) (“The explosion in our prison population began in 
1973, the same year President Nixon declared war on drugs . . . .  There is much 
speculation about the causes of this mass imprisonment mania, but the 
mechanisms by which mass imprisonment was accomplished are clear.  We have 
continued to arrest people at about the same rate since 1973, but since then we 
have sentenced those we convict to prison, for much longer terms, with fewer 
opportunities for parole or early release than in previous years.  When we do 
release someone on parole, we revoke parole and return the parolee to prison 
more often than we formerly did.  That explains how we increased our prison 
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and the effects his involvement had on society were found to be 
paramount, and any deviation from the sentencing law was held to 
be an abuse of discretion.  The rape of the defendant by fellow 
inmates, his nine months spent in jail before trial, and his 
otherwise steady life were irrelevant.  
The Insignares case illustrates the change in priorities from 
rehabilitation and constructive punishments to retribution and 
punitive isolation without regard to prison conditions.  This theme 
pervades the truth-in-sentencing laws,289 oppressive prison 
administration,290 and nearly automatic parole board denials.291 
 
population eightfold; why we did it is less obvious.”). 
 289. See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST., THE INFLUENCE OF TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON 
POPULATIONS (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470 
_FINALTISrpt.pdf.  
 290. See Enhanced Screening of BOP Correctional Officer Candidates Could Reduce 
Likelihood of Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/oig 
/reports/2011/e1102.pdf (describing how improvements made in the Bureau of 
Prisons’ hiring process have reduced the likelihood of officer misconduct and 
recommending that the Bureau develop a scoring mechanism for assessing the 
suitability of officer applicants); Tanyika Brime, We Can Do Better: The State of 
Custodial Misconduct by Correctional Staff in New York, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GEN. 303 
(2009) (analyzing a New York custodial sexual misconduct statute and suggesting 
policy changes to better safeguard inmates); Andrea Jacobs, Prison Power Corrupts 
Absolutely: Exploring the Phenomenon of Prison Guard Brutality and the Need to Develop a 
System of Accountability, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (2004) (analyzing the problems 
inherent in requiring inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before 
bringing grievances for inmate abuse to district court).  In addition to the 
inherent systemic problems with administration of prisons, “compassion fatigue” is 
an inescapable constant.  See Andrew Nolen, Compassion Fatigue and Corrections 
Officers, CORRECTIONS.COM (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.corrections.com/news 
/article/27036-compassion-fatigue-and-corrections-officers (“Compassion fatigue 
is defined as ‘the formal caregivers [sic] reduced capacity or interest in being 
empathic or bearing the suffering of clients and is the natural consequent 
behaviors and emotions resulting from knowing about a traumatizing event 
experience[d] or suffered by a person’ . . . .  It is the ‘reduced capacity or interest 
in being empathic’ that we can distinctly attribute to Corrections Officers.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 291. See, e.g., Joey Hipolito, In Re Lawrence: Preserving the Possibility of Parole for 
California Prisoners, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2009) (discussing a California Supreme 
Court decision that held evidence for denial of parole must be rationally related to 
the inmate’s “current dangerousness”); John Caher, Law Requires Board to Access 
Rehabilitation in Parole Rulings, N.Y. L.J. 1 (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202517412972&slretur
n=1 (discussing application of a New York law requiring parole boards to establish 
whether an inmate has been rehabilitated in determining parole decisions).  
Another factor in the administration of all incarceration policies is “decision 
fatigue,” or determinations based on non-legal reasoning.  See Shai Danzigera et 
al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011), 
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Before conviction, defendants might challenge a sentence on 
Eighth Amendment grounds that it is excessive or 
disproportionate;292 and only after conviction can the conditions of 
confinement be challenged as a “cruel or unusual punishment.”  
But, as the Insignares case and many others illustrate, there should 
be no dividing line between a sentence of imprisonment and the 
conditions connected with its service.  Sentencing judges can take 
into consideration the harm that will befall a defendant after 
incarceration, and some guidelines recognize this reality explicitly 
in the context of vulnerable defendants.  It follows that judges 
should be able to take Eighth Amendment humane punishment 
principles into consideration when calculating someone’s sentence.  
In United States v. Corozzo,293 the defendant, a sixty-nine-year-old 
captain in an organized crime family, faced more than thirteen 
years behind bars.  Under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), the 
United States Attorney requested that the court impose a condition 
on the defendant’s imprisonment and supervised release that 
would curtail his ability to communicate with relatives who had 
criminal records or associate with organized crime members.294  
Judge Weinstein, who presided over the matter, noted that the 
statute was discretionary and rarely used.295  
Ultimately, the court agreed with the defense’s rationale that 
such a condition, without probable cause to believe that the 
defendant would conduct criminal business from inside, was 
tantamount to de facto solitary confinement.296  In reaching this 
conclusion, Judge Weinstein took into account the historical 
record of institutionalized prison cruelty.  Among the examples of 
 
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf (presenting 
evidence that judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous factors that should not 
impact legal decisions); John Tierney, Do You Suffer from Decision Fatigue?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-
suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html?pagewanted=all (discussing study of parole-
granting practices in Israeli prisons that varied according to the time of day). 
 292. See generally Blake J. Delaney, A Cruel and Unusual Application of the 
Proportionality Principle in Eighth Amendment Analysis: Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 
11 (2003), 56 FLA. L. REV. 459, 460–64 (2003) (discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s history of proportionality review in light of its decision to uphold a 
sentence under California’s three strikes law in Ewing); Howard J. Alperin, 
Annotation, Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3D 335 (1970). 
 293. 256 F.R.D. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 294. Id. at 399. 
 295. Id. at 401.  
 296. Id. 
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“unimaginably cruel conditions” behind bars, the judge took note 
of the American prisoners packed like sardines in British prison 
ships during the Revolutionary War and the tens of thousands of 
Union soldiers confined during the Civil War in Andersonville who 
died from “disease, exposure and starvation.”297 
After recounting the horrors of enemy prison camps during 
the Second World War and the Korean Conflict, Judge Weinstein 
concluded by observing that when the government seeks to 
enhance a sentence by aggravating the conditions of confinement, 
the sentencing judge is duty-bound to take into account the history 
of treatment behind bars and the mandate of “justice for all.”298 
The calculus undertaken by Judge Weinstein in Corozzo and 
Judge Hornblass in Insignares demonstrates the value that might 
spring from including a prison conditions factor in sentencing 
policies.  However, as Insignares highlights, there can be conflict 
between the judge and prison officials.  Thus, in the context of a 
broader sentencing realignment like that proposed above, it would 
be important to include specific policies that ensure that a judge’s 
consideration of prison conditions and a judge’s order requiring 
certain protocol with respect to a defendant would be adhered to 
by corrections officials so that prison regulations and actions of 
corrections officials do not trump the intent of the sentencing 
court or the legislature that drafted the penal statutes.299  
B. Transparency and Disclosure 
In addition to policies that would effectuate judicial 
consideration of prison conditions at the sentencing stage, efforts 
should be made to ensure that other actors in the criminal justice 
system and members of the public pay more attention to prison 
conditions.  These are especially relevant steps in light of the 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata.  The case illustrates the difficulty 
that states are having in improving the conditions of confinement 
on an ad hoc basis, whether due to lack of political will or consensus 
 
 297. Id. at 399–400. 
 298. Id. at 400. 
 299. See, e.g., Garner v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 362 
(2008).  The sentencing judge failed to advise defendant about the five year post-
release supervision (PRS) term and so the Department of Correctional Services 
(DOCS) imposed it administratively.  Id. at 360.  Challenging a violation of the 
PRS, the Court of Appeals held that only the sentencing judge had the authority to 
impose the PRS and the DOCS exceeded its jurisdiction.  Id. at 362. 
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on budgetary priorities.  In Plata, prison population reduction was 
a powerful and lawful remedy that was resorted to after years of 
litigation.  From a policy perspective, a more useful approach 
might be for each state to set limits on prison populations.300  This 
per-capita cap policy (based on a percentage of the national prison 
census) is a first step suggested by Professor Lynn Branham in her 
article discussing a multi-faceted plan for changing the mindset 
behind current carceral practices.301  Her next step is to 
recommend a program for monitoring and publishing information 
about the conditions of confinement,302 that is, a move towards 
transparency. 
The “transparency and accountability plan”303 she envisioned is 
rooted in the work of the American Bar Association304 and other 
organizations.305  In essence, enabling legislation in each state and 
the federal government would create an independent monitoring 
agency to investigate and report on prison conditions.306  This 
information would be made available online, and sent to the media 
 
 300. See Lynn S. Branham, “The Mess We’re in”: Five Steps Towards the 
Transformation of Prison Cultures, 44 IND. L. REV. 703, 707–13 (2011) (suggesting a 
fifty percent cap on the states’ per capita rate of imprisonment as a first step in 
changing society’s approach to corrections administration); cf. Cara Anna & David 
Udell, Op-Ed., We Need a National Justice Index, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202534218778&We_need_a_
national_Justice_Index&slreturn=1 (discussing a proposal for ranking states by 
surveying and then publishing data on resources for indigent representation in 
criminal and civil systems, which would be made available to legislators, courts and 
the media); NAT’L CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, http://www.ncforaj.org (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2012) (discussing the Center’s efforts to make courts “accessible 
and fair”).  
 301. Branham, supra note 300, at 707–10. 
 302. Id. at 713–18. 
 303. Id. at 714. 
 304. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS 67–70 (3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_midy
ear2010_102i.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing accountability and oversight in Part 
XI); CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 105B REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/2011a_resolution_105b.authcheckda
m.pdf (adopting “Key Requirements for the Certification of Correctional 
Accrediting Entities,” which include transparency and accountability 
requirements).  
 305. Branham, supra note 300, at 714 n.30; see also Ken Strutin, Criminal Justice 
Resources: Prisoners’ Rights and Resources on the Web, LLRX.COM (Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/prisonersrights.htm (noting sources of prison 
standards).  
 306. Branham, supra note 300, at 714. 
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and to legislators.307  And in response to these reports, prison 
administrators would be required to respond with action plans for 
improvements.308 
The Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata highlighted numerous 
sources that can be mined for information on the conditions of 
confinement (past and present) as well as standards for bringing 
them up to constitutional levels.  Among the sources that ought to 
be developed and consulted are: legislative impact statements;309 
sentencing or correction commission reports;310 judicial monitor 
reports under the PLRA;311 Executive Orders;312 agency and quasi-
agency reports;313 academic314 and private studies;315 and surveys of 
prisoners and other stakeholders.316  Regardless of the information 
 
   307.     Id. at 717. 
 308. Id. at 718. 
 309. See infra notes 317–20 and accompanying text for discussion of carceral 
impact statements. 
 310. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011) (citing California’s 
Corrections Independent Review Panel, appointed by the Governor and 
composed of correctional consultants and representatives from state agencies, as 
well as the Little Hoover Commission, a bipartisan and independent state body). 
 311. See id. at 1924–30 (discussing the work of the court appointed Special 
Master and the California Prison Health Care Receivership Corporation). 
 312. See id. at 1924 (citing Governor Schwarzenegger’s emergency 
proclamation addressing the overcrowding problem). 
 313. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE (2010), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/CDCR_Year_At_A_Glance2010 
.pdf (providing statistics and trend information about various aspects of 
California’s criminal justice system, including adult offenders, juvenile justice, and 
recidivism); PAUL GOLASZEWSKI, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT: 
REDUCING PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511.pdf (expressing 
concern about the state’s ability to meet the court-ordered deadline through 
realignment and suggesting legislative changes to reach those ends).  
 314. See Driscoll, supra note 162 (discussing a study at Stanford Law School on 
the implications of California’s A.B. 109). 
 315. See, e.g., Safe Communities, Fair Sentences, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safe-
communities-fair-sentences-0 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (describing one of the 
ACLU’s campaigns); Our Mission, CORRECTIONAL ASS’N N.Y., http://www 
.correctionalassociation.org/about/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (“The 
Correctional Association of New York is an independent, non-profit organization 
founded by concerned citizens in 1844 and granted unique authority by the New 
York State Legislature to inspect prisons and to report its findings and 
recommendations to the legislature, the public and the press.”). 
 316. See, e.g., Scott D. Camp, Do Inmate Survey Data Reflect Prison Conditions? 
Using Surveys to Assess Prison Conditions of Confinement, 79 PRISON J. 250 (1999), 
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/cond 
_envir/oreprcamp_pj3.pdf (examining whether inmate survey data can be used 
for measures of prison conditions at the group level); Scott D. Camp et al., Using 
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sources, the legislature plays the central role in making the best use 
of them. 
Penal legislation is the result of a process based on supporting 
memos, committee reports, transcripts of debates, and other 
sources of support or opposition.  The legislative history will usually 
include some discussion of the effect the laws might have on 
society, the crime rate, or individual security, but rarely is a 
description of the impact on prison populations or conditions 
included.317  Thus, an effective response to the intolerable 
situations created in the prison system might be to require all penal 
legislation to include an impact assessment.318  
The federal Prison Impact Assessments law, enacted in 1994, 
provides a model to build on: “Any submission of legislation by the 
Judicial or Executive branch which could increase or decrease the 
number of persons incarcerated in Federal penal institutions shall 
be accompanied by a prison impact statement (as defined in 
subsection (b)).”319  Still, critics have pointed out that the law falls 
short of its potential because its coverage is limited and there are 
no remedies for not adhering to it.320 
To present a current accurate picture of the state of prison 
conditions in federal and state institutions, the assessment should 
be issued in conjunction with all new penal legislation under review 
 
Inmate Survey Data in Assessing Prison Performance: A Case Study Comparing Private and 
Public Prisons, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 26 (2002), available at http://www.bop.gov/news 
/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprcamp_cjr.pdf (showing 
that inmate surveys can be used to obtain information about prisons, such as safety 
and security, sanitation, and gang activity). 
 317. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 766–68 (1989) (reviewing the major trends in 
criminal legislative reform movements, the author notes that scarcely any attention 
was given to the impact of new determinate sentencing laws on prison population 
growth). 
 318. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 
1039, 1101 (2002) (“Under both federal and state law, agencies must file an 
‘Environmental Impact Statement’ (EIS) that details the effect of particular 
development decisions on the environment.  Rules could similarly require 
developers to file a ‘Crime Impact Statement’ (CIS) before constructing a large 
project.” (footnote omitted)). 
 319. 18 U.S.C. § 4047(a) (2006); accord MO. REV. STAT. § 217.022(1) (2011) 
(requiring prison impact statement for “any legislation” affecting the prison or 
parole population numbers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-39 (2011) (requiring 
explanatory note for legislation affecting corrections budget). 
 320. See generally Ronald Goldstock et al., In Our Every Deliberation . . . Time for 
Federal Crime Policy Impact Statements, CHAMPION MAG., May 1999, at 18, 20–21 (“We 
propose that Congress revise 18 U.S.C. § 4047 to make it applicable to all criminal 
justice policy proposals.”). 
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and available to participants in the adjudication process.  Thus, it 
could be more than a financial cost-benefits analysis; it would be a 
way to monitor the conditions of confinement and educate 
legislators about the effects of new crimes and punishments.  
Moreover, it could be an effective tool for reviewing existing laws 
that are largely responsible for over-incarceration.  The assessment 
would serve to help lawmakers and courts adjust prison sentences 
to reflect societal values, curb the epidemic of mass imprisonment, 
and humanize sentences by taking into account the conditions of 
confinement.321  
California’s A.B. 109 is a type of post-assessment legislation, 
albeit an assessment driven by litigation, drafted after the prison 
problem reached critical mass.  And the participants in the state’s 
criminal justice system are now fully aware of these circumstances.  
Thus, they will be adjudicating cases in a new framework, localizing 
punishment, and emphasizing alternatives to incarceration.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision might create a ripple effect 
throughout the legislatures322 and criminal justice systems of every 
state, compelling legislators, judges, and prosecutors to consider 
the outcomes of their choices. 
For instance, Professor Adam M. Gershowitz has posited that 
increasing prosecutors’ awareness of prison populations, and ergo, 
conditions, would have an ameliorating impact on charging 
decisions and would result in the reduction of imprisonment 
recommendations.323  He suggests that laws be enacted to require 
systematic monitoring and disclosure of prison information.  
“Prosecutors should be informed about the total number of 
inmates incarcerated, the percentage of prison capacity filled, the 
 
 321. Cf. David A. Rossi, Jumping the Gun: Iowa’s Swift Adoption of Minority Impact 
Statement Legislation Points to Other Problems Within the State’s Criminal Justice System, 
58 DRAKE L. REV. 857 (2010) (examining the purposes and potential problems of 
Iowa’s minority impact statement legislation). 
 322. The “Model Proportionality in Sentencing Act” described in Schneider, 
supra note 11, at 30, would complement and supplement California’s realignment, 
whose delisting of non-violent, non-serious, non-sex offenders from state prison 
sentences is practically a legislative proportionately assessment.  The point made 
clear by California’s new approach and Schneider’s Model Act is that the 
legislature should provide judges with the tools to address the inevitable disparities 
in sentencing laws that result in unconstitutional conditions of confinement and 
other effects detrimental to society’s welfare and safety.  Otherwise, criminal 
courts are left to apply their own patchwork proportionate reviews.  See id. at 33–
34. 
 323. Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment 
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 47 (2008). 
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increase in prison population over the last few years, and whether 
any prisons in the jurisdiction are under court supervision because 
of overcrowding or confinement conditions.”324 
By inculcating this mentality among prosecutors, it would 
increase awareness of the outcomes of prison sentences.  It might 
even lead to a mandatory review of prison conditions as part of the 
presentence investigation, perhaps with input from oversight 
agencies.  In fact, informing judges, prosecutors, and defendants of 
the status of prison life, like a daily stock market report, is in line 
with corrections departments’ and law enforcements’ current 
reporting duties that provide data for policymakers and 
researchers.325 
In an article by Jeffrey Zahler, he suggests that the jury’s right 
to exercise its nullification power supports the right to acquit 
defendants for whom the sentence would be too harsh and 
excessive, that is, their vulnerability to certain prison conditions.326  
Zahler’s thesis is that the jury nullification option could be 
exercised on behalf of vulnerable defendants who face prison 
conditions that would violate the Eighth Amendment.327  In a sense, 
the jury, as the “conscience of the community,” becomes a check 
on the limits of punishment and policy making.328  In reality, it is 
not very different from the concept of punitive damages in a civil 
case.329  A huge damages award is intended to send a message 
disapproving of one party’s conduct, just as acquitting a defendant 
due to the harshness of the sentence might do.330 
Therefore, the jury acquittal becomes the equivalent of an 
 
 324. Id. at 50; see, e.g., 2011 Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) 
(providing weekly population figures for prisoners and parolees and an overview 
of the state’s plan to reduce its number of inmates).  
 325. See generally About JRSA, JUST. RES. & STAT. ASS’N, http://www.jrsa.org 
/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) ( “[The JRSA] is a national 
nonprofit organization of state Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) directors, 
researchers, and practitioners throughout government, academia, and criminal 
justice organizations dedicated to policy-orientated research and analysis.”). 
 326. Jeffrey Zahler, Allowing Defendants to Present Evidence of Prison Conditions to 
Convince Juries to Nullify: Can Only the Prosecutor Present “Moral” Evidence?, 34 N.E. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 485, 516 (2008). 
 327. Id. at 502–09. 
 328. Id. at 516.  
 329. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in 
Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 325 (2011). 
 330. See Studnicki, supra note 220. 
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Eighth Amendment injunction against harsh sentences for 
vulnerable people based on prison conditions.  The possibility that 
jury nullifications based on prison conditions might spark 
legislative or judicial reform suggests an approach from the ground 
up similar to the model suggested for amending the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.331  The impetus for reform could be fueled 
by recognizing that court-applied exceptions to incarcerative 
sentences and jury acquittals are only substitutes for improving 
conditions within the penal system.  In other words, more 
exceptions found by judges and a growing number of not-guilty 
verdicts by jurors would indicate where changes are needed in the 
criminal justice system.332  Thus, those who work in the trenches of 
daily practice might find safety valves to forestall upticks in 
incarceration well ahead of the next crisis. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Prisons are filled with “representatives of humanity.”333  The 
Supreme Court reminded us of this when they decided that the 
evils resulting from overcrowding were unconstitutional and ought 
to be remedied by an order to reduce California’s prison 
population.334  The majority335 was so appalled that they took the 
rare step of including photographs336 of the horrendous living 
conditions in two of the prisons and the cage used for detaining 
prisoners while treating for mental illness.  And California has 
rolled out a virtually new criminal justice system to stem the flow of 
 
 331. See Zahler, supra note 326, at 509–10.  
 332. Id. at 514–15. 
If evidence of prison conditions is admitted in criminal trials, and the 
acquittal rate rises dramatically, society will have a much greater incentive 
to reform the prison system.  If prison conditions are so revolting that 
adequately informed juries are not willing to incarcerate otherwise guilty 
defendants, the solution should be to fix the problems with prisons.  The 
alternative solution currently used, which is to hide the problems in the 
hope that juries can be tricked into incarcerating people who they would 
not choose to condemn if they had more information, is not a solution 
that any society should be proud of. 
Id. 
 333. See Henry, supra note 190, at 202 (describing the concept of “equality as 
dignity”). 
 334. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011). 
 335. It is notable that there were no concurring opinions, which indicates 
solidarity on the reasoning and approach to prisoners’ rights by five of the justices.  
Id. at 1947. 
 336. Id. at app. B & C. 
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non-violent offenders and technical parole violators into state 
prison and at the same time raised the cache of alternatives to 
incarceration.  Overall, the Court’s decision was a tocsin for every 
jurisdiction with prison populations at the boiling point.337 
The exceptions to incarcerative sentences highlight the 
problems with their overuse.  The risk of harm and sexual assault; 
the deleterious impact on the elderly, infirm, and mentally 
challenged; and a host of other factors already discussed have 
justified in individual cases amelioration of the immutable prison 
option.  The catalog of prison-induced harm found in the Supreme 
Court’s decision, the body of penal laws that have been repealed, 
the sentences vacated,338 and the prison conditions declared “cruel 
and unusual”339 are a testament to the need for reform.  
Unconstitutional confinement cannot be tolerated or sanitized out 
of convenience, political/economic necessity, or tradition.  Neither 
the passage of time nor the intensity of public opinion can make a 
virtue of it.340  The development of prisons into precincts of abuse 
is the result of indifference, insensitivity, and collective 
 
 337. See, e.g., Kurt Erickson, Illinois Could Face California-Style Prison Meltdown, 
Experts Say, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:03 PM), http://qctimes.com/news 
/local/article_c3390cb4-cebe-11e0-b9c3-001cc4c03286.html.  In response to 
Illinois’s rising prison population, around 137 percent of capacity, the solution at 
the forefront is to recalculate the available space. 
Instead of using an industry standard based on the number of cells, the 
state is now measuring capacity based on how many beds can fit in a 
facility. . . .  [Rebekah] Evenson [the attorney involved in the California 
lawsuit] said recalculating capacity based on bed space is ‘very, very 
irresponsible’ because it could lead to numerous problems.   
Id. 
 338. See generally Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Length of Sentence as Violation of 
Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3D 335 § 
2[a] (1970). 
 339. See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as 
Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3D 111 § 2[a] (1973). 
 340. See generally CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL 
ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD NONSERIOUS 
OFFENDERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (2009), available at 
http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2009_focus_nonserious_offenders.pdf 
(discussing the Zogby survey that revealed that most people were in favor of 
alternatives to incarceration for non-violent, non-serious crime); Douglas A. 
Berman, “Should Sentences Reflect the Will of the Public?,” SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG, 
(Oct. 12, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and 
_policy/2011/10/should-sentences-reflect-the-will-of-the-public.html (“In his 
tough questioning of USSC Chair Judge Patti Saris, Rep. Gowdy suggested he 
would favor having Congress ‘codify’ the guidelines via statutes (which would, of 
course, require jury findings of all aggravating factors based on Apprendi/Blakely).  
Rep. Gowdy also noted that some states have jury sentencing.”). 
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forgetting.341  Indeed, this article is only part of the ongoing 
dialogue reappraising plea and sentencing practices and modes of 
punishment that have led society to this point.342  
The very existence of the prison system desensitizes people to 
cruelty and promotes indifference to suffering.343  Furthermore, the 
practice of incarcerating millions cuts a swath through 
communities across the nation and through the living fabric of tens 
of millions of families.  Our current system provides a perpetual 
guarantee that an indelible segment of the populace will be tagged 
with a chronic social disease caused by debilitating isolation and 
mistreatment.  The time has come for the collective genius behind 
American justice to abandon this failed approach and invent a new, 
humane direction for our system of punishment.344  And that 
 
 341. These three facets of human nature are responsible at once for the 
survival of cruelty in our lives and institutions, or, as William Blake put it, “Cruelty 
has a human heart.”  William Blake, A Divine Image in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND 
EXPERIENCE (1789), available at http://www.online-literature.com/blake/songs-of-
innocence-and-experie/43/.  See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: 
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007); People ‘Still Willing to 
Torture,’ BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008, 10:41 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/health/7791278.stm (discussing new American experiments validating the 
Milgram test about the willingness of ordinary people to inflict pain on others due 
to social pressure); Philip G. Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment Slide Tour: An 
End to the Experiment, STAN. PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org 
/psychology/37 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (discussing why the experiment was 
terminated early). 
 342. See Mary Ellen Mastrorilli, Replacing “Hard Cells” With “Soft Cells”: A 
Hard Sell for Criminal Justice Policy Makers (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881084; Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the 
Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011).  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS (3d ed., 2010), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice 
_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_midyear2010_102i.authcheckdam.pdf 
(advising the legal profession and judiciary on correctional practices).  
 343. See John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers 
to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 329 (1980) (“Those guilty of serious crimes 
merit the wrath of our society.  But almost no one deserves the hell holes that we 
call jails and prisons.  There is almost no case I would not defend if that meant 
keeping a human being, as condemnable as he or she may be, from suffering the 
total, brutal inhumanity of our jails and prisons.”); David Brooks, Let’s All Feel 
Superior, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15 
/opinion/brooks-lets-all-feel-superior.html (“Some people simply can’t process 
the horror in front of them.  Some people suffer from what the psychologists call 
Normalcy Bias.  When they find themselves in some unsettling circumstance, they 
shut down and pretend everything is normal.”). 
 344. See, e .g., Nicola Abé, Doing Time on Norway’s Island Prison, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist 
/0,1518,744851,00.html (describing a Norwegian prison that “emphasizes self-
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realignment begins with full disclosure about and full 
consideration of the present conditions of confinement and their 
consequences. 
It is the unconstitutionality of prison conditions, made evident 
by Eighth Amendment claims, which compels new policies seeking 
sentence reductions and alternatives to incarceration.  Without a 
policy making the conditions of confinement transparent, 
constitutional justice will be observed only in the breach.345  Once 
lawmakers, adjudicators, and advocates are made aware of the 
conditions of confinement and their effects, the trip hammer of 
carceral punishment might not fall as swiftly.346 
 
 
control instead of the strictly regulated regimens common in most prisons”); 
William Lee Adams, Norway Builds the World’s Most Humane Prison, TIME (May 10, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1986002,00.html 
(“‘In the Norwegian prison system, there’s a focus on human rights and respect,’ 
says Are Hoidal, the prison’s governor.  ‘We don’t see any of this as unusual.’”); 
Jim Lewis, Behind Bars . . . Sort of, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/magazine/14prisons-
t.html?pagewanted=2&sq=Behind%20Bars%20.%20.%20.%20Sort%20of&st=cse&s
cp=1 (describing the Leoben facility in Austria as an example of progressive prison 
design that does not “punish people with architecture”). 
 345. Future generations will continue to follow this practice because 
confinement is a boundless solution that can be utilized by any society indifferent 
to the results or the rights of those who must endure them.  Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, What Will Future Generations Condemn Us For?, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24 
/AR2010092404113.html (“[T]he full extent of the punishment prisoners face 
isn’t detailed in any judge’s sentence.  More than 100,000 inmates suffer sexual 
abuse, including rape, each year; some contract HIV as a result.  Our country 
holds at least 25,000 prisoners in isolation in so-called supermax facilities, under 
conditions that many psychologists say amount to torture.”); Timeline: Prisons in 
England, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2006, 7:28 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk 
_news/4887704.stm (providing an eight century review of prison life and policies 
illustrating that punishments set precedents that are often repeated).  
 346. See generally M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions 
Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2007) 
(studying the effects of security classifications on federal prisoners showing that 
those subjected to severe conditions were more likely to commit new crimes than 
those who served their time in minimal level facilities). 
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